Laborers' Pension Fund v. Miscevic
880 F.3d 927
7th Cir.2018Background
- In January 2014 Anka Miscevic killed her husband Zeljko; a state criminal court found she intended to kill him but was not guilty by reason of insanity.
- Zeljko had a vested pension administered under an ERISA-covered Fund that normally pays a surviving spouse pension.
- Both Anka and the estate of the couple’s minor child (M.M.) claimed the pension; the Fund filed an interpleader.
- Illinois’s slayer statute bars anyone who "intentionally and unjustifiably causes the death of another" from receiving property or benefits by reason of that death.
- District court granted judgment on the pleadings for M.M.’s estate, holding ERISA does not preempt the Illinois slayer statute and that the statute bars recovery even where the killer was acquitted by reason of insanity.
- Seventh Circuit affirms: ERISA does not preempt the Illinois slayer statute, and under Illinois law a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity may still be barred if they "intentionally and unjustifiably" caused the death.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Anka) | Defendant's Argument (Estate of M.M.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does ERISA preempt the Illinois slayer statute? | Egelhoff compels preemption because state law would alter beneficiary payment rules for ERISA plans. | Slayer statute is a traditional state family-law rule and does not have the prohibited connection to ERISA plans. | No preemption; ERISA does not supersede Illinois slayer statute. |
| Does Illinois slayer statute bar someone found not guilty by reason of insanity? | Not guilty by reason of insanity negates the requisite intent; insanity is a defense that should prevent application of the slayer bar. | The amended Illinois statute reaches anyone who "intentionally and unjustifiably causes" a death; civil intent and unjustifiability are distinct from criminal culpability. | Slayer statute applies; a finding of legal insanity does not necessarily prevent a bar if the killer intentionally and unjustifiably caused the death. |
| How to interpret "intent" in slayer statute when criminal intent was negated? | Criminal mens rea is required; absence of criminal intent means no civil bar. | Civil intent differs: it requires only intentional action (not knowledge of wrongfulness). | Civil intent suffices; criminal mens rea is not required for the civil bar. |
| Whether an insanity defense is a "justification" for homicide under the statute | Insanity functions as a justification and should render the killing non-unjustifiable. | Insanity is an "excuse," not a justification; excuse removes criminal punishment but not the civil bar when conduct was intentional and unjustifiable. | Insanity is an excuse, not a justification; the killing can be unjustifiable even if the defendant lacked criminal responsibility. |
Key Cases Cited
- Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001) (ERISA preemption analysis; preemption where state law dictates beneficiary rules and interferes with uniform plan administration)
- Kolbe & Kolbe Health & Welfare Benefit Plan v. Med. Coll. of Wis., Inc., 657 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2011) (framing ERISA preemption test and when plan interpretation triggers preemption)
- Dougherty v. Cole, 401 Ill. App. 3d 341 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (Illinois appellate court holding the amended slayer statute bars those acquitted by reason of insanity when they intentionally and unjustifiably caused death)
- Osman v. Osman, 285 Va. 384 (Va. 2013) (civil intent concept; holding that insanity-based acquittal does not necessarily negate civil intent for slayer-rule purposes)