Labarr v. CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING, INC.
2:21-cv-03849
E.D. Pa.May 19, 2022Background
- Labarr defaulted on a Sprint consumer credit account in 2016–2017 and Sprint closed the account.
- Sprint referred Labarr’s delinquent account to Convergent Outsourcing, Inc. for collection on September 17, 2019.
- Labarr’s Experian credit report showed a Convergent collection account with Date Opened 09/17/2019 and listed Sprint as the original creditor.
- Labarr sued under the FDCPA (15 U.S.C. § 1692), alleging Convergent misrepresented (1) that she had an account with Convergent and (2) the age of the Sprint account (i.e., “re-aging”), and also pleaded §§ 1692d and 1692f claims.
- The parties agreed on the core facts; the report’s Payment History contained a disputed attorney-added note, which the court declined to rely upon.
- The District Court granted Convergent’s Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Labarr’s complaint in full.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether listing a Convergent collection account on Experian violated §1692e by misrepresenting account ownership | Labarr: Experian showed she owed Convergent, but she never had an account with Convergent; this is misleading | Convergent: The report accurately shows a collection account opened by Convergent after Sprint referred the debt; no misrepresentation | Held: No §1692e violation — report differentiates Convergent collection account and Sprint original creditor, so no misleading ownership claim |
| Whether the "Date Opened" entry constituted unlawful "re-aging" under §1692e | Labarr: The 09/17/2019 date made the account appear younger and harmed creditworthiness | Convergent: Date reflects when Convergent opened its collection account (9/17/2019), not Sprint’s original account opening | Held: No §1692e violation — Date Opened pertains to Convergent’s collection account and is accurate on its face |
| Whether Convergent’s conduct constituted harassment or abuse under §1692d | Labarr: Alleges conduct to oppress/harass into payment (bare assertion) | Convergent: No factual allegations of harassment; debt was valid and collection routine | Held: §1692d claim dismissed — plaintiff failed to plead factual support for harassment/abuse |
| Whether Convergent used unfair or unconscionable means under §1692f | Labarr: Asserted §1692f violation tied to alleged misrepresentations (no factual development) | Convergent: Collection methods were routine and report accurately reflected referral and collection account | Held: §1692f claim dismissed — no well-pleaded facts showing unfair or unconscionable means |
Key Cases Cited
- Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995) (FDCPA applies to attorneys who collect consumer debts)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility standard for pleading)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (requirement that pleadings state plausibly entitled to relief)
- Revell v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 598 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2010) (12(c) standard same as 12(b)(6))
- Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Assocs. II P.C., 935 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2019) (pleading and 12(c) framework)
- Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 2005) (judgment on the pleadings appropriate only when no material facts in dispute)