La Joya Independent School District v. Tanya Gonzalez, Individually and A/N/F of Josue Rogelio Uranga, Minor
532 S.W.3d 892
| Tex. App. | 2017Background
- A La Joya ISD school bus driven by Salvador Rodriguez Jr. stopped in a crossover on U.S. Expressway 83 after initially passing a usual stop; Rodriguez activated the bus’s flashing warning lights.
- 13-year-old student Josue Uranga approached to board, crossed the expressway, and was struck and killed by another vehicle. Gonzalez (mother/next friend) sued the bus driver, the driver of the striking vehicle, and La Joya ISD alleging the bus driver’s conduct (stopping in crossover and activating lights) proximately caused the death and the District is vicariously liable.
- The District filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting governmental immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA): (1) Gonzalez failed to give statutory notice; (2) the incident did not involve operation or use of a motor vehicle; and (3) no causal nexus between vehicle use and death.
- At hearings the trial court considered evidence including a bus interior video (transcribed/translated on appeal) in which Rodriguez discusses the accident, expresses that the boy might blame him, says he was parked at the crossover, and calls someone identified as “Lupe” to report the incident; District police arrived and investigated.
- The trial court denied the District’s plea to the jurisdiction; the court of appeals reviewed de novo and affirmed, finding fact issues on actual notice and that the alleged conduct constituted operation/use and that the injury arose from that use.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether District received "actual notice" under TTCA §101.101(c) (so formal notice not required) | Gonzalez: District had actual notice because District personnel appeared, investigated, driver was drug-tested and suspended, and bus driver admitted possible fault to a supervisor/"Lupe" on recording. | District: No written notice was given; it lacked the subjective awareness of alleged fault required for Cathey actual-notice exception. | Fact issue existed whether District had subjective awareness of its fault (driver’s recorded statements and call to "Lupe" support imputing actual notice); plea denied. |
| Whether the incident involved "operation or use" of a motor vehicle under TTCA §101.021(1)(A) | Gonzalez: Stopping the bus in the crossover and activating warning lights are affirmative, operational acts constituting operation/use. | District: The claim did not involve operation or use of a motor vehicle. | Court held stopping the bus and activating lights are practical, purposeful acts constituting operation/use; plea denied. |
| Whether Gonzalez’s claims "arose from" operation or use (causal nexus) | Gonzalez: Uranga would not have crossed and been struck but for the bus driver stopping in crossover and signaling with lights — alleges cause-in-fact and foreseeability. | District: No sufficient nexus; vehicle’s use merely furnished condition for injury. | Pleadings, taken as true, showed both cause-in-fact and foreseeability; the injury arose from operation/use — plea denied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2000) (plea to the jurisdiction framework)
- Miranda v. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (standard for considering jurisdictional facts and evidence)
- Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1995) (definition and requirements for TTCA "actual notice")
- Simons v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 140 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. 2004) (subjective awareness of fault requirement for actual notice)
- LeLeaux v. Hamshire-Fannett Indep. Sch. Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. 1992) (operation/use definitions applied to school bus context)
- Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540 (Tex. 2003) ("arising from" requires nexus beyond mere involvement)
- Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette Cty., 453 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. 2015) (explaining "arising from" standard relative to proximate cause)