982 F.3d 1323
11th Cir.2020Background
- On Feb. 14, 2018, Nikolas Cruz killed 17 and injured 17 at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School; 15 students (plaintiffs) sued Broward County and five officials alleging psychological injuries from the shooting and governmental failures before and during the event.
- Plaintiffs alleged prior reports about Cruz, inadequate school security, a permissive entry by security guard Andrew Medina, school-resource officer Scot Peterson and other officers who remained outside, and Captain Jan Jordan ordering medics to stage outside the building.
- Plaintiffs brought a § 1983 complaint; Count IV asserted a substantive-due-process claim based on defendants’ alleged inability/incompetence to protect students; Count V asserted a First Amendment retaliation claim against Medina; other counts (I–III) raised unrelated Fourth Amendment claims.
- The district court dismissed Count IV (and V) with prejudice as an impermissible shotgun pleading and for failure to state a claim, finding no custodial relationship and no conduct that was "arbitrary" or "conscience shocking;" it allowed some claims to proceed against Peterson but later granted summary judgment for him; the students appealed only Count IV.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed: students were not in defendants’ custody; allegations amounted to negligence/incompetence, not the required intentional or conscience-shocking conduct; deliberate indifference in this non-custodial, split-second context did not suffice; leave to amend was futile.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are the three John Does parties on appeal? | Plaintiffs seek to revive Doe defendants dropped from the amended complaint. | The amended complaint superseded the original; Does were omitted and are not defendants. | Does are not parties; plaintiffs cannot belatedly add them. |
| Do students have a substantive-due-process claim based on a custodial relationship? | Presence of armed school officers and compelled attendance create an exception to the non-custodial rule. | Schoolchildren are not in custody; officers’ presence does not convert that status to custody. | No custodial relationship; no special duty to protect. |
| Does defendants’ alleged deliberate indifference or blocking of medics amount to "arbitrary" or "conscience shocking" conduct? | Defendants knew of Cruz’s danger, failed to intervene, and Jordan prevented lifesaving care; this shows deliberate indifference/conscience shocking behavior. | Conduct arose in a rapidly evolving, dangerous situation requiring split-second judgments and shows negligence/incompetence, not intent to harm. | Conduct did not meet the high "conscience shocking" standard; absent purpose to cause harm, no substantive-due-process violation. |
| Was a failure-to-train claim adequately pled and would amendment cure defects? | Plaintiffs contend failure-to-train is pleaded by incorporation of factual allegations into Count IV. | No standalone failure-to-train claim was properly pled; underlying facts negate an intent-to-harm violation; amendment would be futile. | Failure-to-train was not properly pled; leave to amend would be futile; dismissal with prejudice affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (substantive-due-process claims are disfavored and require care)
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (split-second-judgment contexts require purpose to harm for conscience-shocking finding)
- Nix v. Franklin Cnty. Sch. Dist., 311 F.3d 1373 (schoolchildren are not in custody for substantive-due-process duty-to-protect)
- Wyke v. Polk Cnty. Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560 (custodial relationship requires restraints comparable to confinement)
- White v. Lemacks, 183 F.3d 1253 (no duty to protect absent custody; conscience-shocking standard explained)
- Waddell v. Hendry Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 329 F.3d 1300 (discusses deliberate indifference and constitutional culpability thresholds)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standard: conclusory allegations insufficient)
- Waldron v. Spicher, 954 F.3d 1297 (deliberate indifference in non-custodial, rapidly evolving situations generally insufficient for substantive due process)
- Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239 (futility standard for denying leave to amend)
