L.R. v. Philadelphia School District
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16344
| 3rd Cir. | 2016Background
- In January 2013 a kindergarten student (“Jane”) at W.C. Bryant Elementary was released from her classroom by her teacher, Reginald Littlejohn, to an adult (Christina Regusters) who failed to produce identification or verification of permission to take the child.
- Later that day Regusters sexually assaulted Jane off school premises; the child suffered significant physical and emotional injuries.
- L.R., Jane’s parent, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violation under the state-created danger theory; defendants included the teacher (in his individual capacity), the School District, and the School Reform Commission.
- Defendants moved to dismiss and asserted qualified immunity for Littlejohn; the District Court denied the motion, finding common-sense foreseeability that releasing a five-year-old to an unidentified adult posed inherent risk.
- On interlocutory appeal the Third Circuit accepted the complaint’s allegations as true and affirmed denial of qualified immunity, holding the complaint plausibly alleged a state-created danger and that the right was clearly established.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a state-created danger (substantive due process) violation was adequately pleaded | Littlejohn affirmatively used authority as classroom gatekeeper by releasing Jane to an unidentified adult, creating or increasing danger | Littlejohn’s conduct was a failure to follow policy (an omission), not an affirmative act giving rise to constitutional liability | Complaint sufficiently alleges all four Bright elements of a state-created danger claim (affirmative act, foreseeable/direct harm, conscience-shocking culpability, foreseeable victim) |
| Whether the teacher’s conduct was an "affirmative" act versus inaction | Releasing a child from a supervised classroom to a stranger is a departure from the status quo and an affirmative misuse of authority | School contends release without ID was merely noncompliance with policy—inaction—insufficient for liability | Court treated the release as an affirmative act that created or increased risk (distinguishing DeShaney and Morrow) |
| Foreseeability and causation (was harm a foreseeable and fairly direct result?) | Releasing a five‑year‑old to a stranger predictably exposed the child to risks (kidnap, sexual assault, etc.); the assault was a direct consequence of the release | Defendants argue no facts pleaded showing knowledge of Regusters’ intent or foreseeability of this particular harm | Court held the risk to a young child was obvious and the assault was a fairly direct, not attenuated, result of the release |
| Whether Littlejohn is entitled to qualified immunity (was the right clearly established?) | A reasonable official would have fair warning that removing a vulnerable child from a safe environment and placing her in obvious danger was unconstitutional | Defendants argue insufficiently similar precedent to give fair warning; law too general | Court concluded existing precedent (Kneipp, Rivas and others) gave fair warning that officials may not use authority to expose vulnerable persons to obvious risks; qualified immunity denied |
Key Cases Cited
- DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (U.S. 1989) (Due Process generally does not impose affirmative duty to protect from private violence absent state-created danger)
- Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199 (3d Cir. 1996) (state-created danger doctrine recognized; officers alleged to have created risk by abandoning vulnerable person)
- Bright v. Westmoreland County, 443 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2006) (articulates four-element test for state-created danger claims)
- Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2004) (state actors may be liable for abandoning a person in a dangerous situation when partly responsible for creating the opportunity for harm)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (U.S. 1982) (qualified immunity protects officials from suit unless conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights)
- Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (U.S. 2011) (clarifies standard for clearly established law and notice to reasonable officials)