L. L. v. Evesham Township Board of Education
710 F. App'x 545
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- KL sued Evesham Township School District, its Board, Florence V. Evans Elementary, and several school officials on behalf of his children (LL, KLJR) and himself for race discrimination and retaliation arising from incidents between 2007–2012.
- Allegations included disparate treatment, racial epithets (notably a second-grader’s use of the “n-word” in KLJR’s presence), and other adverse actions and supervisory comments suggesting racial bias.
- Principal Casanova reported the children to NJ child services in March 2008; child services found no abuse. OCR earlier closed an investigation about that report, finding a nondiscriminatory rationale.
- District Court granted summary judgment for defendants on all claims. Plaintiffs appealed. This Court reviews de novo and applies McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting for disparate-treatment claims.
- The Third Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part: it found sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment for Title VI and NJLAD disparate-treatment claims, reversed as to KLJR’s hostile-environment claim, remanded § 1983 claims against individuals, and affirmed summary judgment on § 1981 and retaliation claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs established prima facie disparate-treatment under Title VI/NJLAD | Evidence (racial epithet incident, supervisory comments, differential treatment reports) shows causal nexus to race | Plaintiffs failed to identify comparators; insufficient evidence of discriminatory intent | Reversed: Prima facie case met without specific comparators (McDonnell framework + Anderson guidance) |
| Whether plaintiffs proved hostile-environment based on race under Title VI/NJLAD | Cumulative incidents (including use of the n-word) created severe or pervasive harassment and defendants were deliberately indifferent | Conduct was not severe or pervasive for all plaintiffs | Mixed: Reversed as to KLJR (present when n-word used); affirmed for KL and LL (not severe/pervasive) |
| Whether § 1981 claim applies to public-school attendence context | § 1981 covers discrimination in contractual relationships; plaintiffs argued denial of rights in school context | No impaired contractual relationship identified; § 1981 requires an identifiable contractual relationship | Affirmed: Summary judgment for defendants on § 1981 because plaintiffs failed to identify an impaired contractual relationship |
| Whether § 1983 equal-protection claims survive against municipality and individuals | Plaintiffs allege violations by district and by named officials | Plaintiffs must show municipal policy/custom for Monell liability; individuals must show personal involvement | Affirmed for municipal defendants (no policy/custom shown); reversed/remanded as to individual defendants for further proceedings on personal involvement |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (established burden-shifting framework for discriminatory-treatment claims)
- Anderson v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., 621 F.3d 261 (comparative evidence not required for prima facie McDonnell case)
- Castleberry v. STI Group, 863 F.3d 259 (Title VI hostile-environment/severity standard)
- Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (deliberate-indifference standard for student hostile-environment claims)
- Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470 (§ 1981 requires an impaired contractual relationship)
- Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195 (personal involvement requirement for § 1983 liability)