L. L. v. Dept. of Human Services
455 P.3d 605
Or. Ct. App.2019Background
- L., a developmentally disabled minor in foster care, was sexually abused on a school bus by T., another foster child; L. suffered noneconomic damages.
- Plaintiff, L.’s guardian ad litem, sued the State (DHS) alleging (1) strict liability under ORS 30.297 for intentional torts of a foster child, (2) negligence (later voluntarily dismissed), and (3) abuse of a vulnerable person under ORS 124.100 (claiming DHS “permitted” the abuse).
- DHS moved for summary judgment on the ORS 30.297 and ORS 124.100 claims; the trial court granted summary judgment for DHS on both claims and entered limited judgment dismissing DHS.
- On appeal DHS conceded ORS 30.297 was wrongly interpreted below and withdrew that argument, but maintained summary judgment on ORS 124.100, arguing plaintiff lacked evidence DHS “permitted” the abuse (and earlier had argued the statute only applied to individuals/no vicarious liability and that punitive relief could not be awarded against the state).
- The Court of Appeals reviewed summary judgment de novo, viewing facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and found DHS had largely abandoned its trial-court arguments on appeal.
- The court held ORS 30.297 is not limited to claims by foster parents and reversed on that claim; it also reversed the ORS 124.100 summary judgment because DHS’s motion did not adequately raise the evidentiary-sufficiency issue that the trial court relied on.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of ORS 30.297 — who may sue for damages from intentional torts of a foster child | ORS 30.297 allows suits for damages resulting from intentional torts of foster children generally; not limited to foster parents | ORS 30.297 applies only to foster parents (statute intended to balance costs of foster care) | Reversed: statute’s text/context do not limit the class of plaintiffs to foster parents; summary judgment erroneous |
| Whether ORS 124.100 authorizes claims against the State or only individuals / permits vicarious liability | Statute authorizes suit against a person who “permitted” abuse; plaintiff pursued DHS under that theory | DHS argued statute applies only to the individual committing/allowing abuse, precluding general vicarious liability against DHS and asserted punitive relief issues against the State | Court did not resolve statutory scope; reversed summary judgment because DHS abandoned those arguments on appeal and did not adequately raise them below |
| Whether DHS’s summary judgment motion put at issue plaintiff’s ability to prove DHS “permitted” the abuse | Plaintiff: DHS’s motion sought statutory construction, not to test sufficiency of evidence that DHS “permitted” the abuse; court could not grant SJ on an issue not fairly raised | DHS: the motion’s language about no general vicarious liability put plaintiff on notice to produce evidence that DHS permitted the abuse | Held: DHS’s motion did not adequately raise the evidentiary-sufficiency issue; trial court erred in granting summary judgment on that basis |
Key Cases Cited
- Evans v. City of Warrenton, 283 Or App 256 (summary judgment standard for legal error review)
- Woodroffe v. State of Oregon, 292 Or App 21 (view facts in light most favorable to nonmoving party on summary judgment)
- Burley v. Clackamas County, 298 Or App 462 (courts may not rewrite statutes to add limitations not in text)