L. DeGrossi v. PennDOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 291 C.D. 2017

Licensee Luca DeGrossi was convicted of possession of a controlled substance on January 28, 2014.
The county clerk (Office of Judicial Support) did not report the conviction to PennDOT until August 8, 2016; PennDOT mailed notice of a six‑month license suspension effective August 23, 2016 (≈2 years, 7 months after conviction).
Licensee appealed, arguing the delay was unreasonable and caused prejudice by jeopardizing employment and volunteer/community obligations that require driving.
At the de novo trial‑court hearing Licensee testified he had no subsequent violations and described specific prejudice (job duties, volunteer work, sobriety programs, child visits).
The trial court sustained the appeal and vacated the suspension, relying on Gingrich v. DOT and finding the delay unreasonable and prejudicial.
This Court affirmed, applying Gingrich and Gifford to conclude a 2 year 7 month clerk delay, combined with lack of later violations and demonstrated prejudice, was an "extraordinarily extended" delay warranting reinstatement.

Issue	DeGrossi's Argument	DOT's Argument	Held
Whether a multi‑year delay by the clerk of courts can justify vacating a PennDOT suspension	Delay (2y7m) was "unreasonable" and caused prejudice; suspension should be set aside	Delay was caused by clerk, not DOT; prior precedent bars relief when delay is judicial	Court: Under Gingrich/Gifford, a clerk delay can be excused in limited extraordinary circumstances when combined with lack of subsequent violations and prejudice; relief affirmed
Whether the Gingrich "extraordinary circumstances" exception applies to a ~2 year, 7 month delay	Gingrich exception applies; no bright line — must weigh delay length with prejudice and post‑conviction record	DOT: Gingrich limited to much longer delays; Pokoy and earlier cases remain controlling	Court: Gifford controls — 2y7m delay can be "extraordinarily extended" when balanced with significant prejudice and no later violations
Whether Licensee showed sufficient prejudice to justify vacatur	Job duties, volunteer obligations, sobriety program attendance, risk to employment = significant prejudice	DOT conceded lack of later violations but argued delay was too short to warrant vacatur	Court: Licensee demonstrated significant prejudice; prejudice is central and supports vacatur under Gingrich/Gifford

Gingrich v. Dep’t of Transp., 134 A.3d 528 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (announced limited exception where clerk delay may warrant vacatur if extraordinary, no later violations, and prejudice)
Capizzi v. Dep’t of Transp., 141 A.3d 635 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (applied Gingrich; seven years, ten months delay found extraordinary)
Pokoy v. Dep’t of Transp., 714 A.2d 1162 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (pre‑Gingrich rule: clerk delay does not invalidate suspension; four‑year clerk delay insufficient)
Schultz v. Dep’t of Transp., 488 A.2d 408 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985) (upheld suspension where four‑year delay was clerical)
Currie v. Dep’t of Transp., 142 A.3d 186 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (questioned whether a three‑year clerk delay meets Gingrich’s "extraordinary" standard)
Green v. Dep’t of Transp., 546 A.2d 767 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (explained rationale for generally not charging judicial delays to DOT)
Claypool v. Dep’t of Transp., 618 A.2d 1231 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) (statutory duty of clerk to report is directory; clerk lateness does not negate DOT power to suspend)
Kazil v. Dep’t of Transp., 510 A.2d 148 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986) (upheld suspension where clerical delay was shorter than in current case)
Chrzanowski v. Dep’t of Transp., 505 A.2d 1129 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986) (similar to Kazil)
Davis v. Dep’t of Transp., 527 A.2d 607 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987) (upheld suspension after shorter clerical delay)
O’Connell v. Dep’t of Transp., 555 A.2d 873 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989) (standard of appellate review cited)