L.A.P. v. State, 62 So. 3d 693

L.A.P. is HIV positive and charged under §384.24(2), which criminalizes having sexual intercourse with another person without informing them of HIV status.
L.A.P. engaged in oral sex and digital penetration without informing her partner of HIV status.
Trial court denied a motion to dismiss; L.A.P. pleaded to the charge while preserving appeal of the denial.
The State contends the conduct fits §384.24(2) because it involves sexual activity with a transmission risk.
The court held the statute does not apply because it requires sexual intercourse, not oral or digital contact, so the conviction must be reversed.
Court remanded with directions to discharge L.A.P.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does §384.24(2) apply to L.A.P.’s acts?	L.A.P. argues the statute applies to any form of sexual contact.	State argues the statute covers sexual intercourse with transmission risk.	No; statute requires sexual intercourse, not oral/digital acts.
What is the meaning of sexual intercourse under the statute?	Argues plain ordinary meaning should apply; likely broader.	Argues statutory language should be interpreted literally as written.	Sexual intercourse is limited to penetration as defined in related authorities; plain meaning governs.
Should the conviction be sustained given the plain language?	Conviction should stand if conduct falls within the statute.		Conviction reversed; discharge ordered.

Velez v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Police Dep’t, 934 So.2d 1162 (Fla.2006) (statutory interpretation and language principles cited)
Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740 (Fla.2010) (de novo review of statutory interpretation)
Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So.2d 189 (Fla.2007) (textual approach to statutory interpretation)
Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So.2d 587 (Fla.2006) (legislative intent from text; avoid extending terms)
Overstreet v. State, 629 So.2d 125 (Fla.1993) (presumed to know meanings of words in statute)