Kyleigh Nolan v. Clarksville Police Department and Town of Clarksville, Indiana, 2016 Ind. App. LEXIS 308

In June 2012, 19‑year‑old Kyleigh Nolan volunteered as a hostage for a Clarksville Police Department training exercise and suffered a broken nose after colliding with officers.
Chief Mark Palmer told Nolan and her mother at the scene that the police/Town would pay her medical bills and instructed bills be sent to the Town or that the PD office manager would forward them to the Town’s insurer.
Nolan and her mother repeatedly contacted Chief Palmer over the following months, delivered some medical bills to the police station receptionist, and were told not to worry the Town would pay; the Town never paid.
Nolan filed suit in early 2014; defendants moved for summary judgment asserting Nolan failed to file the ITCA pre‑suit notice within 180 days, barring her claim (Ind. Code § 34‑13‑3‑8).
Nolan conceded she filed no formal timely notice but argued (1) her contacts substantially complied with the ITCA notice requirement, and (2) the Town is estopped from asserting non‑compliance because its agents led her to believe formal notice was unnecessary.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the Town for lack of ITCA notice. The Court of Appeals affirmed as to substantial compliance but reversed as to estoppel, finding a genuine fact issue for trial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Nolan substantially complied with ITCA notice requirement	Nolan: repeated contacts and delivery of bills to PD amounted to substantial compliance	Town: Nolan filed no formal notice within 180 days, so no substantial compliance	Held: No — under Lyons substantial compliance requires filing a timely (if defective) notice; Nolan filed no notice within 180 days, so summary judgment affirmed on this issue
Whether Town is estopped from asserting ITCA notice defense	Nolan: Chief Palmer’s promises and instructions induced her to forego filing notice; she detrimentally relied on those representations	Town: Disputes reliance and raises separation between PD and Town; argues mother’s communications don’t bind Nolan	Held: Genuine issue of material fact exists on estoppel (representations, reliance, detrimental change of position); summary judgment reversed as to estoppel and issue remanded for jury/trial
Proper standard of review for ITCA notice summary judgment	Nolan: standard should permit consideration of disputed factual inferences	Town: urged deferential review grounded in precedent	Held: De novo review applies here because court did not hold evidentiary hearing; negative‑judgment standard applies only where trial court weighed evidence and made factual findings

Lyons v. Richmond Cmty. Sch. Corp., 19 N.E.3d 254 (Ind. 2014) (substantial‑compliance requires a timely filed notice; discovery/fraud exceptions and estoppel may create fact issues)
Schoettmer v. Wright, 992 N.E.2d 702 (Ind. 2013) (describing substantial compliance and estoppel elements under ITCA)
Dunn v. City of Indianapolis, 451 N.E.2d 1122 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (negative‑judgment standard applied where trial court held evidentiary hearing and made findings)
Hupp v. Hill, 576 N.E.2d 1320 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (addressing review standard in ITCA cases)
Butler v. City of Indianapolis, 668 N.E.2d 1227 (Ind. 1996) (summary judgment inappropriate where undisputed facts lead to conflicting inferences)
Delaware Cnty. v. Powell, 393 N.E.2d 190 (Ind. 1979) (estoppel where county admitted liability and told plaintiff it would take care of everything)
Allen v. Lake Cnty. Jail, 496 N.E.2d 412 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (estoppel where governmental agent promised reimbursement, inducing plaintiff not to litigate)
Coghill v. Badger, 418 N.E.2d 1201 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (affirming summary judgment where no actionable representations were made)