Kyle Willhite v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
90A02-1603-PC-581
| Ind. Ct. App. | Oct 21, 2016Background
- In 2007 a then-15-year-old victim (S.M.) reported molestation by Kyle Willhite that allegedly occurred in summer 2001–2002 when Willhite was about 14 and S.M. about 10; Willhite signed a statement admitting the conduct and his age at the time.
- The State filed a juvenile delinquency petition; in 2009 the juvenile court waived the matter to adult court pursuant to an agreement: Willhite would consent to waiver and the State would charge a reduced Class C felony with an executed cap of four years.
- Willhite pled guilty in adult court (open plea accepted in 2012) and admitted performing oral sex on S.M.; he was sentenced to four years with all but 2 years and 15 days suspended.
- Before sentencing Willhite moved to dismiss claiming statute-of-limitations and factual impossibility defenses (relying on an eviction order). The trial court denied dismissal.
- Willhite sought post-conviction relief arguing (1) the juvenile court erred in waiving jurisdiction, (2) ineffective assistance by juvenile and trial counsel (failure to investigate age/timing and choice of statutory-limitation argument), and (3) the PCR court abused discretion by excluding three proffered exhibits; the PCR court denied relief and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Willhite's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether juvenile court erred in waiving to adult court | Waiver improper because record did not establish Willhite was 14 when acts occurred (evidence like eviction, death certificate, recorded statement show he might have been 13) | Juvenile court record and hearing provided sufficient facts; waiver was properly considered and agreed to by Willhite | No error; waiver supported by record and Willhite’s own sworn admission that he was 14 when offense occurred |
| Whether trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction | Trial court lacked jurisdiction if juvenile waiver was invalid | If waiver was proper, circuit court has jurisdiction over criminal cases | Trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction because waiver was proper and circuit courts have jurisdiction over criminal cases |
| Whether juvenile counsel was ineffective | Counsel failed to adequately investigate and use documents that would show Willhite was 13, coercing waiver and plea | Counsel investigated, knew of age dispute, and reasonably negotiated waiver to limit exposure given Willhite’s sworn statement that he was 14 | No ineffective assistance: counsel’s strategic decision to negotiate was reasonable and petitioner failed to show prejudice |
| Whether trial counsel was ineffective | Counsel should have challenged jurisdiction (waiver) rather than pursue statute-of-limitations dismissal | A jurisdictional challenge would be meritless because waiver was valid; statute-of-limitations motion was appropriate | No ineffective assistance: jurisdictional challenge would have been futile and no prejudice shown |
| Whether PCR court abused discretion by excluding exhibits | Exclusion of eviction order, victim’s audiotape, and death certificate prejudiced the PCR hearing and would support waiver/jurisdiction claim | Exhibits were cumulative or not outcome determinative; court discussed their substance and took judicial notice of records | No abuse of discretion; exclusion was harmless because exhibits would not have overcome Willhite’s sworn statement or changed result |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (applies Strickland test to challenges to guilty pleas)
- Thomas v. State, 562 N.E.2d 43 (juvenile-waiver record need not recite detailed findings if record supports conscientious determination)
- Vance v. State, 640 N.E.2d 51 (absence of particular facts in waiver order does not invalidate waiver if record supports decision)
- Daniel v. State, 582 N.E.2d 364 (same principle on sufficiency of waiver record)
- Phelps v. State, 969 N.E.2d 1009 (standard of review for juvenile waiver; civil burden preponderance)
- Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739 (post-conviction standard: petitioner must prove claims by a preponderance and appellate standard of review)