Kyle Ray Himes v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
690 F. App'x 640
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Kyle Himes was convicted in Florida of robbing a bank (Dec. 8, 2006). He listed Regina Walker as an alibi witness; she later moved and was deposed before trial.
- At her deposition Walker could not confirm the exact date of the barbecue that Himes claimed provided his alibi and could not say with certainty Himes was present on Dec. 8, 2006.
- On the morning of trial Himes moved for a continuance to locate and subpoena Walker; the trial court denied the motion and the jury convicted Himes. Himes was sentenced to 15 years.
- Himes raised a federal habeas claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 arguing the denial of the continuance violated his due process right to present an alibi witness. The district court granted conditional habeas relief relying on a multi-factor test from former Fifth Circuit precedent.
- The State appealed. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court, holding the district court failed to apply AEDPA deference and that the Florida courts’ summary denial was not an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law.
Issues
| Issue | Himes' Argument | Secretary's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denying a continuance to locate an alibi witness violated due process | Denial prevented presentation of a crucial alibi witness (Walker) and prejudiced Himes | No clearly established Supreme Court precedent requires reversal; state courts reasonably denied continuance given Walker’s uncertain deposition and cumulative nature of her testimony | Reversed district court; state-court denial was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent |
| Whether the district court applied proper AEDPA deference | District court should review merits and grant relief because continuance denial violated Ungar and circuit precedents | District court erred by conducting de novo review and relying on circuit precedent rather than applying § 2254(d) deferential standard | District court erred; must defer to state-court adjudication under AEDPA |
| Whether Ungar or Lee clearly establish that denial of continuance for alibi witness is per se due process violation | Ungar and Lee support that denial can violate due process and warrant relief | Ungar is a general rule not on-point; Lee did not decide the merits; no clearly established Supreme Court holding requires relief | Ungar and Lee do not clearly establish a rule mandating reversal; Lee did not reach merits; Ungar is general and gives state courts leeway |
| Whether circuit precedent (Uptain/Hicks) can define "clearly established" Supreme Court law for AEDPA purposes | Uptain/Hicks multi-factor test shows denial was unconstitutional | Circuit precedent cannot substitute for Supreme Court holdings under AEDPA | Circuit precedent cannot be treated as "clearly established" Supreme Court law; district court mistakenly relied on it |
Key Cases Cited
- Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (general statement that arbitrary insistence on speed can render right to defense illusory)
- Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (procedural-default discussion; did not decide merits on continuance denial)
- Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (circuit precedent is not "clearly established" Supreme Court law for AEDPA)
- Fotopoulos v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 516 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2008) (AEDPA deference framework in Eleventh Circuit)
- Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2013) (clarifying "no reasonable basis" burden when state court issues summary denial)
- United States v. Uptain, 531 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1976) (multi-factor continuance test relied on by lower federal courts)
- Hicks v. Wainwright, 633 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981) (applied Uptain to find denial of continuance violated due process)