Kwang Park v. Merrick Garland
72 F.4th 965
| 9th Cir. | 2023Background
- Petitioner Kwang Hyen Park, a lawful permanent resident and South Korean citizen, was arrested twice in three days (April 2018) on drug- and weapon-related charges; police seized multiple drugs, scales, cash, and a loaded handgun.
- Park pleaded guilty to 13 charges, including possession of cocaine for sale (Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11351), and received concurrent 674-day jail terms and five years’ probation.
- DHS charged Park with removability as an aggravated felony (drug trafficking) and controlled-substance offender; Park applied for cancellation, asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection.
- The IJ found Park ineligible for cancellation and asylum, held his § 11351 conviction a particularly serious crime (relying on Matter of Y-L- principles), and denied CAT relief as speculative and not torture.
- The BIA affirmed: it applied the Matter of Y-L- presumption for drug trafficking, agreed the presumption was not rebutted given Park’s arrests, drug quantities/types, and firearm, and affirmed denial of CAT after clarifying the proper legal standard.
- The Ninth Circuit denied Park’s petition for review, holding the BIA applied the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence supports denial of CAT relief.
Issues
| Issue | Park's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the BIA misapplied Matter of Y-L- presumption that drug-trafficking aggravated felonies are "particularly serious crimes" | Park: BIA relied on facts from a separate arrest (firearm) and considered improper/unlisted factors, so it applied the wrong standard. | Garland: BIA cited Matter of Y-L-, reasonably relied on IJ facts (multiple arrests, multiple drugs, firearm) and properly found Park did not overcome the strong presumption. | Court: BIA applied Matter of Y-L- and did not abuse discretion; even if some nonlisted facts were cited, the outcome was compelled on the record. |
| Whether the BIA impermissibly engaged in predictive fact-finding / adopted IJ error regarding CAT standard | Park: IJ misstated legal standard (said torture must be "on account of" protected ground), so BIA improperly adopted infirm factual findings without remand. | Garland: BIA reviewed IJ predictive findings for clear error, corrected the legal standard, and applied it de novo to the facts. | Court: BIA acted within its mixed standard (clear-error for facts, de novo for law); IJ error was cured by BIA’s de novo legal analysis. |
| Whether the BIA failed to provide a reasoned explanation for denying CAT relief | Park: BIA’s decision was cursory and insufficiently reasoned; review should be limited to BIA text. | Garland: BIA reasonably relied on and cited the IJ’s detailed CAT findings; the combined record supplies adequate reasoning. | Court: When BIA relies on IJ, the IJ opinion may be consulted; read together, the BIA and IJ provided adequate explanation. |
| Whether substantial evidence compels CAT relief based on (a) risk of reprosecution/punishment for U.S. drug convictions and (b) risk from South Korean military conscription (including alternative labor) | Park: South Korean extraterritorial law and harsh statutory penalties (including life/forced labor/death) make reprosecution and torturous punishment likely; conscription and mistreatment of expatriates create a particularized torture risk. | Garland: Criminal prosecution/punishment and conscription are lawful sanctions that ordinarily are not torture; the chain of events leading to reprosecution and extreme punishment is speculative; record shows no particularized risk to Park as an expatriate. | Court: Substantial evidence supports denial of CAT—prosecution/punishment and conscription are lawful/sweeping policies, speculative or non-particularized; aggregation of risks does not make torture likely. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miguel-Miguel v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2007) (affording Chevron deference to the Attorney General’s Matter of Y-L- presumption that drug-trafficking aggravated felonies are presumptively particularly serious crimes)
- Bare v. Barr, 975 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2020) (describing Frentescu factors and standard for particularly serious crime determinations)
- Hernandez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 757 (9th Cir. 2022) (review standards and adequacy of agency explanation)
- Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683 (2020) (criminal-alien jurisdiction bar does not preclude review of factual challenges to CAT denials)
- Garland v. Ming Dai, 141 S. Ct. 1669 (2021) (courts must uphold agency decisions if the agency’s path can reasonably be discerned)
- Perez-Palafox v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2014) (BIA reviews IJ’s predictive factual findings for clear error and reviews legal application de novo)
- Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) (criminal prosecution and punishment generally do not constitute persecution or torture)
