972 N.W.2d 337
Mich. Ct. App.2021Background
- Married in 1981; separated in 2019. Parties had no minor children at separation. Defendant worked part-time; plaintiff retired from federal service and receives a FERS pension (~$4,000/month).
- The parties signed a consent judgment divorcing and providing that plaintiff’s OPM (federal) pension “shall be divided equally” and that defendant “shall be considered a surviving spouse” for distribution purposes.
- Defendant’s counsel later submitted a Court Order Acceptable for Processing (COAP) directing payment of the former-spouse share to defendant for the remainder of the employee’s lifetime and, if the former spouse dies before the employee, directing OPM to pay the former spouse’s share to her estate.
- Plaintiff (pro se at the time) objected, arguing that the COAP departed from the parties’ agreement and produced a windfall to defendant; the trial court nevertheless signed the COAP under the MCR 2.602(B)(3) “seven-day rule” and denied reconsideration.
- The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded: it held the phrase “divided equally” ambiguous as to post-death treatment, concluded plaintiff was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on parties’ intent, and found the trial court misapplied the seven-day rule in entering the COAP.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hein) | Defendant's Argument (Hein) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the COAP provision directing payment of the former-spouse share to the former spouse’s estate if she predeceases the employee comports with the consent judgment’s term “divided equally” | “Divided equally” meant defendant gets half during her lifetime (and survivor annuity only if she outlives plaintiff); plaintiff’s estate should not be deprived if defendant dies first | The divorce judgment (and MCL 552.101(4)) assigns a proportionate share of all pension components, so the COAP’s language is consistent with an equal division and allows estate payment if specified | The term “divided equally” is ambiguous as to post-death treatment; both constructions are reasonable, so the COAP’s contested provision is not facially compelled by the consent judgment |
| Whether an evidentiary hearing was required to resolve the ambiguity in the consent judgment | Requested a hearing (pro se) and claimed the COAP departed from the agreement | Argued COAP reflected parties’ agreement / statutory default | Court of Appeals held plaintiff (given pro se status and ambiguity) had sufficiently requested a hearing; remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine parties’ intent |
| Whether the trial court properly entered the COAP under MCR 2.602(B)(3) (the seven-day rule) | The seven-day rule was misapplied; it only authorizes entry of an order reflecting a court decision and cannot be used to enter a consent judgment or to adopt an order when the court had not already granted the underlying relief | Trial court relied on the seven-day mechanism to enter the COAP | Trial court erred: the seven-day rule did not apply here; entry under MCR 2.602(B)(3) was improper, requiring vacatur |
| Whether federal regulations preempt or control so as to resolve the parties’ dispute | Relied on 5 C.F.R. § 838 provisions to show federal default rules favor plaintiff’s construction (payments terminate at retiree’s death unless expressly provided) | Relied on MCL 552.101(4) and statutory inclusion of components to support COAP | Court found no federal supremacy problem; both federal regs and state statute supply defaults and permit departures, so the dispute is one of contractual intent, not preemption |
Key Cases Cited
- Peterman v. Dep’t of Natural Resources, 446 Mich 177 (Mich. 1994) (preservation principles)
- Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (U.S. 1976) (pro se pleadings entitled to liberal construction)
- Andrusz v. Andrusz, 320 Mich App 445 (Mich. Ct. App. 2017) (consent judgment treated as contract)
- Klapp v. United Ins. Group Agency, Inc., 468 Mich 459 (Mich. 2003) (contract interpretation reviewed de novo)
- Hudson v. Hudson, 314 Mich App 28 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016) (MCL 552.101(4) includes pension components unless expressly excluded)
- Hessel v. Hessel, 168 Mich App 390 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (seven-day rule applies only after court grants relief)
- Jones v. Jones, 320 Mich App 248 (Mich. Ct. App. 2017) (limitations on use of the seven-day rule)
- Kendzierski v. Macomb Co., 503 Mich 296 (Mich. 2019) (contract ambiguity principles)