Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp.
132 S. Ct. 1261
| SCOTUS | 2012Background
- Corson worked as a welder and machinist in locomotive repair, affecting brakeshoes and insulation, prior to a mesothelioma diagnosis in 2005.
- In 2007, Corson and his estate filed state-law tort claims in Pennsylvania against 59 defendants including RFPC and Viad for asbestos-related injuries.
- The complaint alleged defective design and failure to warn regarding asbestos-containing locomotive components.
- After Corson’s death, executrix Gloria Kurns was substituted as plaintiff; defendants removed to federal court and moved for summary judgment on pre-emption grounds.
- The district court granted summary judgment; the Third Circuit affirmed; this Court granted certiorari to address LIA field pre-emption under Napier.
- Napier defined the LIA field as the regulation of locomotive equipment, guiding the pre-emption analysis in this case.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does LIA field pre-empt state-law claims? | Corson seeks to keep claims outside Napier field. | LIA pre-empts the design and warning claims under Napier. | Yes, pre-empted under Napier. |
| Did FRSA alter LIA pre-emption scope? | FRSA pre-emption supplants LIA field pre-emption and leaves warnings not pre-empted. | FRSA does not alter Napier; it leaves LIA field intact. | FRSA did not alter LIA pre-emption. |
| Are failure-to-warn claims within Napier's pre-empted field? | Warnings relate to post-design liability and should avoid pre-emption. | Failure-to-warn claims target locomotive equipment and fall within the pre-empted field. | Yes, failure-to-warn claims pre-empted as to equipment. |
| Do claims against manufacturers fall within LIA pre-emption? | Manufacturers were not regulated under LIA at Corson’s exposure. | Napier defines field by equipment, not entity; manufacturers’ claims fall within field. | Yes, pre-empted by Napier’s equipment-based field. |
| Do state common-law duties escape pre-emption? | Common-law duties can co-exist with federal regulation via damages. | LIA occupies entire field; common-law duties are pre-empted. | States’ common-law duties directed to locomotive equipment are pre-empted. |
Key Cases Cited
- Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926) (held LIA occupies the entire field of locomotive equipment)
- Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (statutory preemption can bar state tort claims under certain regimes)
- Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004) (express vs. implied preemption and field pre-emption concepts)
- San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (labor regulations and preemption framework via indirect effects)
- Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995) (field preemption considerations in federal regulation scope)
- Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (distinction between design defect and warnings in preemption context)