KS&E Sports and Edward J. Ellis v. Dwayne H. Runnels
2017 Ind. LEXIS 308
| Ind. | 2017Background
- In 2011 Blackburn purchased a Smith & Wesson handgun from KS&E and shortly after transferred it to Demetrious Martin, a convicted felon who then shot Officer Dwayne Runnels; Runnels was injured and Martin was killed.
- Blackburn later pleaded guilty to making a false statement in acquiring the firearm (a straw purchase). Runnels sued KS&E, Blackburn, and KS&E officer Ellis asserting negligence, negligent entrustment, negligent hiring/training, negligence per se, civil conspiracy, public nuisance, and piercing the corporate veil.
- KS&E and Ellis moved for judgment on the pleadings under Ind. Trial Rule 12(C) arguing Indiana Code § 34-12-3-3(2) bars suits for damages resulting from a third party’s criminal misuse of a firearm and therefore requires dismissal.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision; the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer to resolve whether § 34-12-3-3(2) immunizes firearms sellers from damages suits arising from third-party misuse, even for allegedly unlawful sales.
- The Supreme Court held the statute is clear and functions as a limited immunity from suits seeking money damages that "result from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a firearm by a third party," but does not bar claims seeking equitable relief.
- As applied, the Court dismissed Runnels’s negligence, negligent entrustment, negligence per se, negligent hiring/training, civil conspiracy, and veil-piercing claims (all seeking only damages), but allowed the public-nuisance claim to proceed to the extent it seeks injunctive/equitable relief; the statute was held neither preempted by federal law nor unconstitutional.
Issues
| Issue | Runnels' Argument | KS&E's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does I.C. § 34-12-3-3(2) bar suits for damages when a third party criminally misuses a firearm obtained from the seller? | The statute should not shield culpable sellers who unlawfully facilitate straw purchases; plaintiffs must be able to sue sellers who violate law. | The statute unambiguously bars recovery of damages for injuries resulting from a third party’s criminal misuse of a firearm, requiring dismissal. | The statute unambiguously bars damages claims that result from a third party’s criminal or unlawful misuse, even if the sale was unlawful. |
| Is § 34-12-3-3(2) an immunity from suit or merely a defense to liability? | It should not eliminate access to courts for meritorious claims against culpable sellers. | It functions as immunity because the chapter mandates dismissal and fee awards for unauthorized suits. | The provision operates as an immunity from suit (limited to recovery of damages). |
| Does the immunity cover non-damages relief (e.g., injunctive or abatement relief for public nuisance)? | Plaintiffs may seek equitable relief (injunction/abatement) to remedy public nuisance and the statute should not bar such claims. | The statute bars actions under §3 and thus could bar injunctive claims under §5(3). | The immunity is limited to damages; equitable remedies (public-nuisance injunctive/abatement relief) survive. |
| Is § 34-12-3-3(2) preempted by federal law (PLCAA) or unconstitutional under state/federal constitutions? | PLCAA’s exceptions for unlawful seller conduct displace state immunity; statute violates open-courts, equal privileges, and due process. | The PLCAA does not preempt states from granting greater protection; statute is constitutional. | No preemption: PLCAA does not clearly manifest intent to preempt state immunity. Constitutional challenges fail (Open Courts, equal privileges, due process). |
Key Cases Cited
- Veolia Water Indianapolis, LLC v. National Trust Ins. Co., 3 N.E.3d 1 (Ind. 2014) (standard for Rule 12(C) judgment on the pleadings)
- Ballard v. Lewis, 8 N.E.3d 190 (Ind. 2014) (statutory interpretation: clear and unambiguous statutes are applied according to plain meaning)
- Basileh v. Alghusain, 912 N.E.2d 814 (Ind. 2009) (court will apply plain, ordinary meaning when statute is unambiguous)
- City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 2003) (recognizing public-nuisance claims against firearm dealers based on straw purchases and illegal distribution)
- McIntosh v. Melroe Co., 729 N.E.2d 972 (Ind. 2000) (legislature may modify or abrogate common law causes of action; Open Courts analysis)
- Peavler v. Board of Comm’rs of Monroe County, 528 N.E.2d 40 (Ind. 1988) (examples of statutes that functionally confer immunity despite not using the word "immunity")