Kruse v. Vanderbilt Minerals, LLC
189 So. 3d 42
| Ala. | 2015Background
- Dansby W. Sanders worked at Mobile Paint from 1965–2002; Mobile Paint used various grades of Nytal talc supplied by R.T. Vanderbilt (Nytal 200/300/400) at both its Conception (dusty, poor ventilation) and Theodore (ventilated, but mixing mezzanine above filling area) plants.
- Sanders was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2009 and sued multiple defendants; Vanderbilt was added in 2010 as a supplier of Nytal talc; Dansby died in 2010 and the estate pursued wrongful-death claims.
- Vanderbilt moved for summary judgment arguing plaintiff failed to show Dansby was directly exposed to Vanderbilt’s talc; Vanderbilt’s written motion did not challenge whether Vanderbilt talc contained asbestos.
- At the summary-judgment hearing Vanderbilt argued instead that its talc never contained asbestos; the trial court granted summary judgment concluding Vanderbilt’s talc did not contain asbestos.
- Plaintiff later produced expert reports and deposition testimony (Rigler, Fitzgerald, Millette, Abraham, others) asserting that Nytal talc contained asbestiform minerals; plaintiff moved to vacate; the trial court denied the motion.
- The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, holding the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on an issue (asbestos content) not raised in Vanderbilt’s written motion and finding genuine factual disputes on product identification/exposure.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court properly granted summary judgment on lack of asbestos content when defendant’s motion attacked only product-identification/exposure | Kruse: Vanderbilt’s motion challenged only product identification; asbestos content was to be addressed later and by expert discovery; court erred to grant on that basis | Vanderbilt: Court may grant on lack of asbestos content because plaintiff produced no admissible evidence that Vanderbilt talc contained asbestos | Reversed — summary judgment improperly granted on a ground not raised in the written motion; movant must identify evidentiary failure relied on |
| Whether plaintiff produced sufficient evidence of exposure to Vanderbilt’s Nytal talc (product identification/proximity) | Kruse: shipping records, Mobile Paint VP testimony, and coworker testimony show Nytal was supplied and used regularly and Dansby entered mixing area daily for decades; dust reached his work area | Vanderbilt: Plaintiff did not directly work with or identify Vanderbilt talc in deposition; evidence of exposure to Vanderbilt product is speculative | Held that plaintiff produced substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of fact as to exposure; summary judgment on product-identification grounds not warranted |
| Whether post-motion expert evidence could be considered after summary judgment | Kruse: plaintiff’s experts were deposed per scheduling order after the product-identification motion deadline; asbestos-content evidence came after defendant’s motion and trial court relied on it without prior notice | Vanderbilt: Plaintiff could have submitted expert affidavits earlier and had disclosed opinions before motion; post-judgment submission is untimely | Court found the trial-court timing and scheduling made plaintiff’s later expert evidence timely to dispute the unpled asbestos-content ground; reversal warranted because plaintiff lacked notice and opportunity to rebut |
| Standard for proving exposure/causation in asbestos cases | Kruse: cites Sheffield — plaintiff need only show product was present at jobsite and causation is for jury; frequency/proximity evidence suffices | Vanderbilt: plaintiff must show direct exposure to defendant’s asbestos-containing product and that exposure was a substantial factor | Court applied the higher-frequency/regularity/proximity causation approach and held plaintiff met even the stricter standard — factual disputes remain for jury |
Key Cases Cited
- Pittman v. United Toll Systems, 882 So.2d 842 (Ala. 2003) (standard of review for summary judgment is de novo)
- Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860 (Ala. 1988) (standard for reviewing summary-judgment evidence)
- Wright v. Wright, 654 So.2d 542 (Ala. 1995) (movant must show entitlement to judgment as a matter of law)
- Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794 (Ala. 1989) (burden shifts to nonmovant to present substantial evidence)
- Sheffield v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 595 So.2d 443 (Ala. 1992) (product identification is a threshold element in asbestos claims)
- Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1986) (frequency-regularity-proximity test for asbestos causation)
- Farr v. Gulf Agency, 74 So.3d 393 (Ala. 2011) (movant must indicate where nonmovant’s case lacks evidence)
- Rector v. Better Houses, Inc., 820 So.2d 75 (Ala. 2001) (summary-judgment burden-shifting on failure-of-proof motions)
- Hollis v. City of Brighton, 885 So.2d 135 (Ala. 2004) (court should not grant summary judgment on grounds not raised in motion)
- Wheeler v. George, 39 So.3d 1061 (Ala. 2009) (appellate courts may affirm on any valid ground in the record)