112 N.E.3d 302
Mass. App. Ct.2018Background
- Teresa Krupien, a long‑time employee at the Commonwealth's Chelsea Soldiers' Home, was issued a paid stay‑away directive barring her from the Home's campus after a coworker alleged Krupien injured her wrist while moving a patient.
- The Home's campus includes St. Michael's Chapel, where Krupien had worshipped continuously since 1994; Krupien told Kirkland (HR liaison) that her church was on campus and that she wanted to attend Christmas services in two days.
- Kirkland recommended the stay‑away; Acting Superintendent Ritcey signed and implemented the directive the same day, which immediately prevented Krupien from attending chapel and from working a second job on campus.
- The directive remained in effect, unmodified, for 37 days; the Home sought legal counsel only after that period and then lifted restrictions on chapel attendance under conditions.
- Krupien sued under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (G. L. c. 12, §§ 11H, 11I), alleging the directive substantially burdened her free exercise of religion; the sole issue on appeal was whether Kirkland and Ritcey were entitled to qualified immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the stay‑away directive violated Krupien's free exercise rights under the MCRA | The directive barred her from her long‑standing place of worship (a chapel on campus) during investigation and substantially burdened her religious exercise | The directive was a workplace safety measure during an assault allegation and did not target religion; art. 2’s peace limitation could justify it | Court: Evidence viewed favorably to Krupien suffices to permit a finding the directive substantially interfered with free exercise |
| Whether the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for issuing the directive | Krupien: The right to worship was clearly established and the directive was not narrowly tailored; reasonable officials would know the burden was unlawful | Ritcey/Kirkland: No controlling precedent on identical facts; reasonable officials could believe the directive lawful during an investigation | Court: Qualified immunity denied — general free‑exercise rules were clearly established and a reasonable official should have known barring chapel attendance was not narrowly tailored given the information (and information they failed to obtain) |
| Whether a stay‑away may ever include a place of worship | Krupien: Not addressed as a per se exclusion; burden requires strict scrutiny and narrow tailoring | Defendants: A stay‑away policy applicable to workplace violence can include campus facilities, including chapel | Court: State may bar access in certain circumstances (e.g., proven menace, violence at worship, or specific risk); not a blanket prohibition here given lack of evidence of risk at chapel |
Key Cases Cited
- Clancy v. McCabe, 441 Mass. 311 (2009) (qualified immunity inquiry—reasonable official belief in lawfulness)
- Lanier v. United States, 520 U.S. 259 (1997) (general constitutional rules can give fair warning even absent identical precedent)
- Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (objective legal reasonableness for qualified immunity)
- Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667 (1993) (strict scrutiny applies when fundamental rights are implicated)
- Ahmad v. Department of Correction, 446 Mass. 479 (2006) (facility policies burdening free exercise must be narrowly tailored to compelling interests)
- Magazu v. Department of Children & Families, 473 Mass. 430 (2016) (framework for exemption balancing: sincerely held belief, burden, compelling interest, substantial hindrance)
- Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (only interests of highest order can override free exercise)