376 F. Supp. 3d 1
D.C. Cir.2019Background
- Plaintiff purchased/renewed an AARP‑branded Medigap policy and alleges AARP (and affiliates) collected a concealed 4.95% charge (characterized publicly as a “royalty”) that in practice functioned as a commission diverted to AARP/ASI.
- Plaintiff asserts District of Columbia consumer protection and common‑law claims: violation of the CPPA, conversion, unjust enrichment, and fraudulent concealment/omission.
- Defendants moved to dismiss on multiple grounds: application of the filed‑rate doctrine, choice of law (Florida/Louisiana vs. D.C.), statute of limitations, lack of standing, and failure to state claims.
- Court held that the filed‑rate doctrine does not bar the plaintiff’s state‑law claims because the injury alleged concerns deceptive conduct about the charge, not regulation of insurance rates.
- Court applied District of Columbia law (choice‑of‑law), found the statute‑of‑limitations defense premature on the pleadings, held plaintiff has Article III standing for damages (but not injunctive relief), and denied dismissal on all four substantive claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of filed‑rate doctrine | Plaintiff: claims challenge deceptive characterization of a charge, not reasonableness of regulator‑approved rates. | Defendants: pass‑through of regulator‑approved rates shields claims. | Filed‑rate doctrine does not bar claims; dispute is about misrepresentation of the charge, not rate‑setting. |
| Choice of law | Plaintiff: D.C. law applies because AARP headquartered and scheme devised/executed in D.C. | Defendants: Louisiana or Florida law governs because purchase/renewal occurred there and states have Medigap regulatory interests. | D.C. law governs under governmental‑interest and Restatement §145 significant‑relationship analysis. |
| Statute of limitations / timeliness | Plaintiff: last renewal in 2016; discovery/continuing tort/fraudulent concealment tolling may save claims. | Defendants: claim accrued at 2012 purchase and is time‑barred. | Dismissal premature; accrual and tolling are fact questions and complaint is not conclusively time‑barred. |
| Sufficiency of claims (CPPA, conversion, unjust enrichment, fraud) | Plaintiff: alleged material misrepresentations/omissions about the 4.95% charge, merchant status of AARP, and resulting economic harm. | Defendants: no standing/injury, not a "merchant," disclosures were adequate, and fraud not pled with particularity. | All claims survive pleading stage: plaintiff alleges injury‑in‑fact, merchant status plausibly plead, misrepresentations material, and fraud/omission pleaded with required particularity. |
Key Cases Cited
- Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (forum state's choice‑of‑law rules govern diversity cases)
- Shaw v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 605 F.3d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (D.C. has interest in applying CPPA to regulate conduct of D.C.-based businesses toward out‑of‑state consumers)
- In re APA Assessment Fee Litig., 766 F.3d 39 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (applied D.C. choice‑of‑law principles to misrepresentation claims by out‑of‑state plaintiffs against D.C. headquartered defendant)
- Washkoviak v. Student Loan Mktg. Ass'n, 900 A.2d 168 (D.C. 2006) (modified governmental‑interest and most‑significant‑relationship approach guided by Restatement §145)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (constitutional standing framework)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (concrete injury requirement for standing)
- Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (allegations of economic harm suffice for standing at motion‑to‑dismiss stage)