Kristine Marie Murrell v. State
01-15-00200-CR
| Tex. App. | May 28, 2015Background
- On July 17, 2014 Kristine Murrell was stopped by Harris County Deputy Junius Simon at ~1:30 a.m.; she was later charged with misdemeanor DWI.
- Simon testified he had ~18 months patrol/DWI experience with HCSO and previously served 14 years with the U.S. Department of State.
- Simon followed Murrell ~1.5 miles, testified she drove below the posted 40 mph limit (variously described as ~30 mph or 10–15 mph under limit) and frequently changed speeds.
- Simon said Murrell made multiple lane changes after turning onto Cypresswood Drive, and signaled each time; he speculated “more than three times” but did not quantify precisely.
- Simon noted (without defining the area) that there were “several” alcohol-serving establishments nearby; he did not observe Murrell leaving a bar, did not observe weaving, and did not use radar/pacing testimony to establish speed.
- The trial court denied Murrell’s motion to suppress, adopted the State’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and found Simon credible and that the totality of the circumstances justified the stop.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Murrell) | Defendant's Argument (State/Trial Court) | Held (trial court) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether conclusory observations (variable/slow speeds; area has bars) can support reasonable suspicion | Speed and speed-variation testimony was conclusory and unsupported (no radar/pacing); "several" bars was undefined; such conclusory facts deserve no weight | Officer’s observations of slow/alternating speeds and proximity to alcohol establishments contribute to reasonable suspicion | Motion to suppress denied (court credited speed/area findings) |
| 2. Whether factual findings (drifting, officer experience, significance of time) are supported by record | Court’s findings that Murrell ‘‘drifted,’’ that Simon had extensive DWI experience from Dept. of State service, and that 1:30 a.m. signaled bar-closing activity are unsupported by the record | Court credited officer’s testimony and judicially noticed experience/time/area factors as relevant | Court found officer credible and relied on those findings to deny suppression |
| 3. Whether lawful lane changes (signaled) suffice for reasonable suspicion for DWI | Lane changes while signaling (even frequent) are lawful and insufficient alone to create reasonable suspicion; excising unsupported/conclusory facts leaves only signaled lane changes by an inexperienced officer | When combined with speed variation, time, location, and officer’s training/experience, the conduct provided articulable suspicion to investigate DWI | Court concluded totality (including lane changes, speed, time, area, experience) produced reasonable suspicion; motion denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (conclusory officer opinions cannot substitute for specific articulable facts; narrow exception for objective facts)
- Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (mere opinion or conclusory testimony insufficient to support reasonable suspicion)
- Miller v. State, 393 S.W.3d 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (trial-court credibility findings are afforded deference only if supported by the record)
- Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (reasonable-suspicion standard for investigatory stops; totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry)
- Foster v. State, 326 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (contextual discussion of locations like bar districts and relevance to reasonable suspicion when supported by testimony)
- United States v. Neufeld-Neufeld, 338 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2003) (officer with 18 months’ experience may be considered inexperienced; experience of partner can affect analysis)