918 F.3d 372
4th Cir.2019Background
- Kristiana Burrell received the Essure birth‑control implant; she alleges device failure, a stillbirth, and subsequent hysterectomy caused by Essure.
- The Burrells sued Bayer in North Carolina state court asserting negligence, products‑liability, breach of warranties, fraud, and unfair trade practices, and alleged violations of FDA requirements as parallel theories.
- Essure is a Class III medical device approved under the FDCA; Congress limited state rules that are "different from, or in addition to" federal requirements (21 U.S.C. § 360k).
- Bayer removed to federal court invoking federal‑question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, arguing the complaints necessarily raise substantial federal questions about compliance with FDA regulation (including reporting duties).
- The district court retained jurisdiction under Gunn’s four‑part test and dismissed the case on preemption grounds; the Burrells appealed jurisdiction and the merits.
- The Fourth Circuit vacated the federal judgment and remanded to North Carolina state court, holding § 1331 did not authorize removal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1331 federal‑question jurisdiction exists over state‑law tort/products claims involving an FDA‑regulated device | Burrell: claims are state‑law causes of action; any federal issues are defenses or alternative theories and do not create federal jurisdiction | Bayer: plaintiffs’ complaints necessarily raise federal issues (FDA compliance/preemption), so case "arises under" federal law | No—§ 1331 does not extend to this case; remove improperly denied and case must be remanded |
| Whether the FDCA/preemption defense makes federal law a "necessarily raised" element of plaintiff’s claims | Burrell: preemption is an affirmative defense; plaintiffs need not plead around it; state‑law elements can be proven without federal law | Bayer: because § 360k preemption is central, plaintiffs must prove deviations from federal standards, making federal law necessary | No—relying on Franchise Tax Bd. and Pinney, anticipated defenses (including preemption) do not satisfy the well‑pleaded complaint rule |
| Whether plaintiffs’ allegations that rest on federal duties (negligence per se, fraud on FDA, failure to report) convert the claims into federal ones | Burrell: such allegations are alternative theories; at least one supporting state‑law theory exists for each claim that does not require federal law | Bayer: certain pleaded theories expressly depend on federal statutory duties and so necessarily raise federal questions | Even assuming some theories require federal law, jurisdiction still fails because every legal theory supporting each claim need not require federal law; alternatives defeat "necessarily raised" requirement |
| Whether the federal issues Bayer identifies are "substantial" and consistent with federal‑state balance | Burrell: alleged federal questions are fact‑bound, backward‑looking, party‑specific, and not substantial enough to shift venue to federal courts | Bayer: FDA regulation and need for uniform adjudication of device regulation make the federal questions substantial | No—following Merrell Dow and Grable, the claimed federal issues are factintensive, not of broad federal importance, and allowing removal would upset the congressionally approved division of labor; remand required |
Key Cases Cited
- Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (mere presence of federal issue in state tort claim does not automatically confer § 1331 jurisdiction)
- Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g, 545 U.S. 308 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (identifies rare circumstances where a federal issue in a state claim is substantial enough for federal jurisdiction)
- Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (four‑part test for federal‑question jurisdiction where state law supplies cause of action)
- Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (FDCA preemption framework for premarket‑approved medical devices)
- Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (limitations on § 1331 jurisdiction over state‑law claims implicating federal issues)
- Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (well‑pleaded complaint rule and limits on removal based on defenses)
- Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430 (4th Cir. 2005) (preemption defense anticipated in complaint does not create federal jurisdiction)
- Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 1994) (plaintiff may be entitled to recover under alternative state‑law theories; negligence‑per‑se allegation does not necessarily create federal jurisdiction)
