Krishack, E. v. Milton Hershey School
145 A.3d 762
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2016Background
- Appellant Edward Krishack attended Milton Hershey School (MHS) from 1948 to 1953 as a student and performed farm chores in a housing/farm environment.
- After leaving MHS, Krishack lived and worked on various farms and in construction, where he again performed soil- and dust-related work and horse-related activities.
- In 1998 Krishack sought treatment for emphysema; in 2001 his doctors found old granulomatous disease (calcified deposits) on his lungs with no established cause.
- In 2013 Krishack filed a complaint against MHS alleging histoplasmosis exposure at MHS; MHS moved for summary judgment arguing no evidence the fungus existed at MHS and the claim was time-barred.
- The trial court denied summary judgment in 2014, then granted it in 2015 after discovery, concluding Krishack failed to prove theHistoplasma fungus was present at MHS and that causation was established.
- On appeal, the Superior Court reviewed de novo the grant of summary judgment, focusing on whether proximate causation was proven and whether expert opinions were adequately grounded in facts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether proximate causation was proven to link MHS exposure to histoplasmosis | Krishack argues experts show exposure caused histoplasmosis at MHS | MHS contends there is no evidence the fungus existed at MHS and causation is speculative | Proximate causation not proven; summary judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Eckroth v. Penn. Elec., Inc., 12 A.3d 422 (Pa. Super. 2010) (proximate causation and substantial factor standard in negligence)
- Krauss v. Trane U.S. Inc., 104 A.3d 556 (Pa. Super. 2014) (summary judgment set aside where genuine issues exist; inference cannot be conjecture)
- Rodriguez v. Kravco Simon Co., 111 A.3d 1191 (Pa. Super. 2015) (standard for granting summary judgment; nonmovant must show genuine issues of material fact)
- Gillingham v. Consol Energy, Inc., 51 A.3d 841 (Pa. Super. 2012) (expert testimony must have a factual basis and cannot be based on mere possibilities)