969 N.E.2d 1068
Ind. Ct. App.2012Background
- Kranzes own Lot 49 at Bass Lake; surrounding easement holders have used a Group Pier at the end of the easement for decades.
- DNR and NRC determined the Group Pier required a permit; ALJ allowed the Group Pier contingent on a permit and required Kranzes to relocate their pier.
- NRC adopted the ALJ’s order; Kranzes sought judicial review challenging jurisdiction, rule compliance, substantial evidence, and takings.
- DNR’s permit denial rested on safety, navigability, and compatibility concerns in a narrow corridor around the Group Pier.
- ALJ and NRC ordered adjustments: move Kranzes’ pier, move Bartoszek’s pier, and set Group Pier limits with no mooring; Barroszek and Kranzes appealed again.
- Circuit Court affirmed NRC; Kranzes appeal to Indiana Court of Appeals, arguing lack of jurisdiction and takings, among other issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does NRC have jurisdiction over riparian rights for permit purpose? | Kranzes argue NRC lacks jurisdiction over property rights. | DNR/NRC contend jurisdiction to resolve riparian rights is necessary to implement permit process. | NRC has jurisdiction to determine riparian rights to implement permit process. |
| Did NRC properly apply its own rules governing group pier buffers? | Kranzes say NRC violated 312 IAC 11-4-8(c)(1) by not following buffer rules. | NRC correctly applied rule, with a buffer consistent with the rule’s spirit. | Yes; NRC properly applied the rule. |
| Is the NRC decision supported by substantial evidence regarding safety and navigation? | Kranzes contend evidence does not support safety concerns being alleviated. | NRC found relocation of piers mitigates safety and navigability concerns. | Yes; substantial evidence supports the decision. |
| Does the decision constitute an unconstitutional taking of Kranzes' property? | Kranzes claim the order confiscates riparian rights and constitutes a taking. | Decision does not take property; only relocates pier within public lake rights. | No taking; regulation does not deprive economically of all use. |
Key Cases Cited
- Schnippel Const. v. Ind. Dept. of Envtl. Mgmt., 778 N.E.2d 407 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (deference to agency expertise; arbitrary/capricious review standard)
- River Road Lounge, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 590 N.E.2d 656 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (additional precedent on review standards)
- Brown v. Heidersbach, 360 N.E.2d 614 (Ind. App. 1977) (riparian rights not conveyed by easement; court basis for jurisdiction)
- Klotz v. Horn, 558 N.E.2d 1096 (Ind. 1990) (ambiguity of easement language; parol evidence of original intent)
- Gunderson v. Rondinelli, 677 N.E.2d 601 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (easement scope and pier placement; appealability of determinations)
- Center Townhouse Corp. v. City of Mishawaka, 882 N.E.2d 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (riparian rights and public access considerations)
- Daisy Farm Ltd. v. Morrolf, 886 N.E.2d 604 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (riparian rights and public lake access context)
- Biddle v. BAA Indianapolis, LLC, 860 N.E.2d 570 (Ind. 2007) (regulatory taking framework; modern taking analysis)
- Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (U.S. 2005) (regulatory takings: property must be substantially used)
- Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (U.S. 1992) (economic impact and nature of taking tests)
- Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (U.S. 1978) (regulatory takings framework and investment-backed expectations)
- Dep't of Natural Resources v. Ind. Coal Council, Inc., 542 N.E.2d 1000 (Ind. 1989) (factors in taking analysis)