Kramer v. Szczepaniak
123 N.E.3d 431
Ill. App. Ct.2019Background
- At ~2:00 a.m., plaintiffs Jasmine Vega and Sean Kramer requested an Uber ride; driver Farid Kessanti accepted but got lost, became angry, and forcibly ejected them several blocks from their destination in a poorly lit, high-traffic area.
- Vega and Kramer walked toward home and, while crossing Kedzie Street in a crosswalk, were struck by a separate driver, John Szczepaniak, who allegedly was speeding and fled the scene; both plaintiffs were injured.
- Plaintiffs sued Szczepaniak and, in later amended complaints, sued Kessanti, Uber, the vehicle owner (Bachir), and Cab Investment Group on theories of common-law negligence, statutory negligence, negligent entrustment, and negligent voluntary undertaking.
- Defendants (Uber, Kessanti, Bachir, Cab) moved to dismiss under 735 ILCS 5/2-615, arguing lack of proximate cause because Szczepaniak’s intervening negligence was unforeseeable and superseded any liability.
- The circuit court dismissed counts against those defendants with prejudice, finding the negligent driver was an intervening, superseding cause; the Appellate Court reversed and remanded, holding proximate cause (foreseeability) was a factual question not resolvable at the pleading stage.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs pleaded cause in fact (substantial factor) from Kessanti/Uber’s conduct | Ejecting them forced them to walk and thus was a substantial factor — absent ejection the collision would not have occurred | The hit-by-car was the intervening act of a third party and not caused by defendants | Cause in fact adequately pleaded: ejection was a material/substantial factor — dismissal on this ground improper |
| Whether defendants’ conduct was legal proximate cause (foreseeability) of being struck by another negligent driver | Foreseeable that abandoning passengers in a dark, high-traffic, late-night area with bars could result in negligent driving or other harm | Intervening negligent driving was unforeseeable as a matter of law and superseded defendants’ negligence | Legal causation is a fact question here; alleged circumstances make the risk foreseeable enough to survive a §2-615 dismissal |
| Whether negligent driving per se breaks the causal chain as a matter of law | Negligent driving does not automatically break the chain when earlier wrongdoing actively put plaintiffs in harm’s way | Negligent driving generally is an intervening event that severs liability for the earlier actor | Court: ‘‘negligent driving’’ is not dispositive; context matters and dismissal was premature without developed record |
| Whether dismissal was procedurally proper where plaintiffs did not file a written response to the §2-615 motion | Plaintiffs had repeatedly litigated foreseeability and the trial court had previously reviewed the arguments; fairness precludes deeming the issue forfeited | Defendants argued plaintiffs forfeited proximate-cause argument by not filing a written response | Court found no forfeiture given long history of briefing and prior rulings; reached merits |
Key Cases Cited
- Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252 (1999) (explains cause-in-fact vs. condition analysis and foreseeability for intervening acts)
- Thompson v. Gordon, 241 Ill. 2d 428 (2011) (common-law negligence requires proximate cause)
- Abrams v. City of Chicago, 211 Ill. 2d 251 (2004) (legal causation and foreseeability may be decided as matter of law in some contexts)
- Bentley v. Saunemin Township, 83 Ill. 2d 10 (1980) (holding original tortfeasor may be liable where its active wrongdoing foreseeably leads to intervening negligence)
- Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority, 152 Ill. 2d 432 (1992) (discusses ‘‘reasonable certainty’’ for causation)
- Trevino v. Flash Cab Co., 272 Ill. App. 3d 1022 (1995) (denial of ejected passenger’s claim on summary judgment improper where icy sidewalk injury could be foreseeable)