Kovacic v. Cuyahoga County Department of Children & Family Services
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15805
| 6th Cir. | 2013Background
- In 2002, social workers removed Kovacic children from Nancy’s home under TEC order due to alleged imminent risk.
- The TEC Order was issued after consultation with an assistant prosecutor and a supervisor, with police present.
- A subsequent juvenile court magistrate found probable cause for removal and ordered emergency custody.
- The district court denied absolute immunity in part and denied qualified immunity in full; the social workers appealed.
- The district court treated the removal as a police-like action for absolute-immunity purposes, while recognizing prosecutorial functions in initiating court proceedings.
- The district court and appellate briefing focused on immunity—absolute or qualified—rather than merits of Fourth/Fourteenth Amendment claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether social workers are entitled to absolute immunity for removal actions | Kovacic argues removal was prosecutorial, not police-like | Social workers contend removal was police-like, not within absolute-immunity scope | Remedy affirmed only for certain prosecutorial acts; removal denied absolute immunity |
| Whether social workers are entitled to qualified immunity for the removal without a warrant | Exigent circumstances did not exist; removal violated the Fourth Amendment | Exigent circumstances or endangerment justified removal; rights not clearly established | District court denied qualified immunity; in part affirmed—exigency not clearly established for removal; remanded for further proceedings |
| Whether the rights at issue were clearly established in 2002 | Right not clearly established for social workers removing children without warrant | Existing state statutes allowed actions; rights not clearly established in 2002 | Court held Fourth Amendment warrant requirements with exigency apply; due-process rights in 2002 were clearly established |
| Whether § 2151.31(A)(6) could justify removal in this case | § 2151.31(A)(6) supports reasonable-removal conduct | § 2151.31(A)(3) was the applicable basis; § 6 not relevant here | Affirmed denial of qualified immunity; § 2151.31(A)(6) not applicable to the removal at issue |
| Whether the court should exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over related issues | Appeal should review all immunity rulings | No pendent-review of merits; jurisdiction limited to immunity rulings | Court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction; reserved judgments on certain issues |
Key Cases Cited
- Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Children & Fam. Servs., 640 F.3d 716 (6th Cir.2011) (absolute immunity for acts 'intimately associated with the judicial phase')
- Doe v. Staples, 706 F.2d 990 (6th Cir.1983) (due process in child-removal cases requires notice and hearing where no emergency)
- Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (U.S. 1980) (warrant requirement generally applicable absent exigent circumstances)
- Andrews v. Hickman Cnty., 700 F.3d 845 (6th Cir.2012) (discussion of social workers and Fourth Amendment in 2002 context; clearly established state of law)
- Jordan v. Murphy, 145 F. App’x 513 (6th Cir.2005) (unsettled Fourth Amendment issue for warrantless social worker entries (context))
- Rippy v. Hattaway, 270 F.3d 416 (6th Cir.2001) (prosecutorial function for initiating proceedings can be absolute-immunity relevant)
- Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (U.S. 1985) (collateral-order appealability of denial of qualified immunity)
- Leech v. DeWeese, 689 F.3d 538 (6th Cir.2012) (absolute immunity appealability standards)