Koty v. Dupage Cnty., 900 F.3d 515

Koty, a DuPage County deputy, requested an SUV (more legroom) as an ADA accommodation for a hip condition; physician letters supported the request.
The Sheriff's Department measured vehicles, concluded the SUV offered no additional legroom, and denied the requested model; Koty alleges measurement error.
After Koty filed an EEOC complaint, the Department reassigned him to courthouse duty (no squad car driving required).
While on courthouse duty he was temporarily taken off active special operations status, asked to submit a weapon-storage plan for return to active status, and later returned to law enforcement (initially assigned to midnight shift, then daytime shift after transfer).
Koty sued under the ADA for failure to accommodate and for retaliation; the district court dismissed the accommodation claim (no qualifying disability) and granted summary judgment for the County on retaliation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Koty alleged a qualifying "disability" under the ADA	Koty alleged femoral hip impingement with torn labrum aggravated by assigned vehicle; sought accommodation (SUV)	County: complaint lacks allegation that impairment substantially limits a major life activity	Held: Koty failed to allege a disability; accommodation claim dismissed
Whether reassignment to courthouse duty was an adverse action (retaliation element)	Koty: reassignment was punitive/less prestigious and thus materially adverse	County: lateral reassignment to accommodate restrictions is not adverse; no pay cut and transfer was a reasonable accommodation	Held: not materially adverse; assignment was a permissible accommodation
Whether removal from active special operations, plan requirement, return-to-duty placement, and shift change were adverse or pretextual	Koty: these steps were retaliatory and discriminatorily imposed after EEOC filing	County: these actions flowed from the courthouse reassignment, were non-diminishing of pay or status, and followed policy; legitimate nonretaliatory reasons	Held: none of these actions were materially adverse, and County’s explanations were not shown to be pretext

Williams v. Seniff, 342 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 2003) (standards of review for dismissal and summary judgment)
Gogos v. AMS Mech. Sys., Inc., 737 F.3d 1170 (7th Cir. 2013) (ADA disability pleading requirement)
Winsley v. Cook County, 563 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2009) (discussing driving as a potential major life activity)
Dickerson v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 522, 657 F.3d 595 (7th Cir. 2011) (elements of ADA retaliation claim)
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (U.S. 2006) (definition of materially adverse actions in retaliation context)
Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2009) (lateral transfers generally not materially adverse)
Jay v. Intermet Wagner, Inc., 233 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2000) (employer prerogative to choose a reasonable accommodation)
Hancock v. Potter, 531 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 2008) (employer accommodation efforts not necessarily adverse)
Burton v. Bd. of Regents, 851 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2017) (pretext requires more than mistaken reasoning; a phony reason)