Kote, S. v. The Bank of New York, 169 A.3d 1103

Background

Appellant Spiro Kote appeals a July 14, 2016 judgment affirming trial court orders that sustained Carrington and Safeguard's preliminary objections and granted BNY Mellon's motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Kote was assaulted while delivering Chinese food at a foreclosed, vacant property at 6298 Kindred Street in Philadelphia on January 28, 2014.
BNY Mellon owned the Property; Carrington acted as its sales agent; Safeguard was hired to secure and inspect the Property.
Kote amended his complaint alleging negligence, maintenance-code violations, and Restatement-based duties, asserting knowledge of criminal activity in the area.
The trial court dismissed Carrington and Safeguard and granted judgment on the pleadings for BNY Mellon; the Superior Court reviews de novo the rulings on demurrers and judgments on the pleadings.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was Kote a business visitor under § 332?	Kote relies on § 332(3) and Comment c to show invitation by the possessor.	Kote was not invited by BNY Mellon, Carrington, or Safeguard; the caller was an unknown criminal.	Not a business visitor
Did BNY Mellon owe a duty to business visitors under § 344?	If Kote is a business visitor, BNY Mellon had a duty to warn or protect against third-party harm.	Kote was not a business visitor, so § 344 does not apply.	Duty not established
Did § 324A require exercising reasonable care in undertaking to render services?	Carrington/Safeguard undertook to secure the Property and protect third parties; failure to act could be actionable under § 324A.	Kote is not within the protected class; the undertaking was for the owner and prospective buyers, not delivery workers.	§ 324A not applicable
Did § 365 require disclosure of disrepair to render the Property reasonably safe?	Disrepair and unsecured entries could create unreasonable risk to visitors.	Disrepair did not cause Kote's harm and was not the proximate cause; it facilitated but did not cause the injury.	§ 365 not satisfied
Were the criminal acts of third parties a superseding cause under § 448?	Third-party criminal acts could be a proximate cause if not superseded by an intervening act.	Unknown assailants' actions were a superseding cause; risk was not foreseeable.	Criminal acts superseding; no proximate causation
Was Kote protected by the Philadelphia Property Maintenance Code (negligence per se)?	Code violation could support negligence per se.	Even if applicable, the superseding third-party acts break the chain of proximate causation.	Negligence per se not established
Are Carrington and Safeguard bound by the same duties as BNY Mellon?	Agents share duties arising from the principal's obligations.	No duties owed to Kote; no proximate cause shown by any party's conduct.	No relief; not bound in this manner

Key Cases Cited

Glick v. Olde Town Lancaster, Inc., 535 A.2d 621 (Pa. Super. 1987) (securing vacant dwellings not intended to protect general public from criminal acts)
Farabaugh v. Pa. Turnpike Comm’n, 911 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2006) (contractual duties limited to undertakings; third-party harm analysis)
Roche v. Ugly Duckling Car Sales, Inc., 879 A.2d 785 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (duty to third parties requires a recognized duty before § 448 applies)
Reilly v. Tiergarten Inc., 633 A.2d 208 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (proximate cause standard for superseding causes)
Brown v. Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine, 760 A.2d 863 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (proximate cause and foreseeability in proximate causation analysis)
Walters v. UPMC Presbyterian Shadyside, 144 A.3d 104 (Pa. Super. 2016) (negligence per se analysis requires applicable statutory purpose and proximate causation)
Wagner v. Anzon, Inc., 684 A.2d 570 (Pa. Super. 1996) (negligence per se framework and statutory purpose)
McCloud v. McLaughlin, 837 A.2d 541 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (statutory/ordinance-based duty through negligence per se analysis)