Kopplow Development, Inc. v. the City of San Antonio, 399 S.W.3d 532

Kopplow Development, Inc. purchased 18.451 acres in San Antonio near Loop 410 to develop it, obtaining permits and filling to the 100-year flood level under a vested rights permit.
The City planned a regional stormwater detention facility that would inundate part of Kopplow’s parcel and the adjacent tract, and later sought easements for the project.
Kopplow refused to donate an easement; the City obtained a drainage easement and constructed structures overlapping Kopplow’s easements.
The City’s project raised Kopplow’s property above the prior 100-year flood level, effectively making development dependent on further fill to the new level.
Kopplow sought damages under statutory takings and inverse condemnation theories; the jury awarded both an easement value and remainder damages.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is Kopplow’s inverse condemnation claim ripe for adjudication?	Kopplow argues the claim is ripe because the development-rights restriction exists regardless of actual flooding.	City contends the claim is premature under Gragg until flooding occurs.	Not premature; inverse claim ripe because the restriction on development, not flooding, supports compensation.
Does proximate cause affect Kopplow’s inverse condemnation claim and damages?	Kopplow asserts the City’s project directly caused the impediment to development.	City argues causation is limited to the use of the part taken; inverse claim not undermined.	Causation supports the inverse condemnation claim and damages for both easement and remainder.
May damages for the inverse condemnation claim be recovered separately from statutory damages?	Kopplow sought recovery for the fill and related remainder damages.	City argued damages should fit statutory takings framework; inverse damages limited.	Yes; remainder damages are recoverable under inverse condemnation, and easement damages under statutory takings.
Was Kopplow’s inverse condemnation claim properly preserved and argued?	Kopplow maintained the claim as both statutory and inverse and preserved the inverse claim.	City argued lack of specific inverse claim and improper ripeness.	Kopplow’s inverse condemnation claim was preserved and ripe; not waived.

Gragg v. Texas?, 151 S.W.3d 546, 151 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. 2004) (recurrence and intent in flood-related takings; Gragg does not bar Kopplow's inverse claim)
Jennings v. City of Dallas, 142 S.W.3d 310, 142 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. 2004) (intent to cause identifiable harm; flood impacts probative for takings)
Westgate, Ltd. v. State, 843 S.W.2d 448, 843 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. 1992) (inverse condemnation; future loss not necessary for current claim)
Allen v. City of Texas City, 775 S.W.2d 863, 775 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989) (inverse claim premature where no flooding occurred)
Hubler v. City of Corpus Christi, 564 S.W.2d 816, 564 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1978) (inverse claim prematurity where no flooding occurred)
Howard v. City of Kerrville, 75 S.W.3d 112, 75 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002) (regulatory takings; distinction from present development-based claim)