Koontz v. Watson, 283 F. Supp. 3d 1007

Kansas enacted House Bill 2409 (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-3740f) requiring state contractors to certify they are not participating in a boycott of Israel; Secretary of Administration may waive the requirement if compliance is "not practicable."
Esther Koontz, a Mennonite and curriculum trainer for Kansas's Math and Science Partnership, refused to sign the certification and was denied state contracting opportunities; she did not seek the statutory waiver.
Koontz sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the law violates the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause; she moved for a preliminary injunction to block enforcement of the certification requirement.
The State argued Koontz's claim was not ripe (she had not sought a waiver) and suggested mootness via a prospective waiver; the court applied a relaxed ripeness test for facial First Amendment challenges and found ripeness and lack of mootness.
On the merits the court applied Pickering/Umbehr principles, concluded boycott activity is protected speech under NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, found the statute to be viewpoint/subject-matter discriminatory and not narrowly tailored, and granted a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the certification requirement as to independent contractors.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Ripeness for judicial review	Koontz challenged the statute facially; requiring a waiver request is not prerequisite	Koontz's claim is unripe because she never sought the Secretary's waiver	Court: claim is ripe under relaxed First Amendment ripeness (ACORN, Richardson, Stout)
Mootness / voluntary cessation	Denial or enforcement of the statute causes a live controversy; waiver by Secretary is not guaranteed for others	Secretary would have granted Koontz a waiver, mooting the dispute	Court: not moot; voluntary cessation/possibility of future enforcement prevents mootness
First Amendment protection of boycott	Boycotts to influence government/policy are protected speech (Claiborne); Koontz's boycott is expressive conduct	State contends it may condition contracting on conduct and relies on Rumsfeld (regulation of conduct)	Court: boycott is inherently expressive (Claiborne); protected; Rumsfeld distinguishable because it regulated non-expressive conduct
Constitutionality of certification requirement	Certification is viewpoint/subject-matter based and not narrowly tailored; waiver power is vague and undercuts rationale	State asserts interests in trade relations, preventing discrimination, and economic harms justify the law	Court: State failed to show sufficiently strong interest; statute is viewpoint/subject-matter discriminatory and not narrowly tailored; preliminary injunction granted

Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142 (Holmes concurring) (federal courts cautiously review democratically enacted laws)
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (federal courts must follow Supreme Court precedent)
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (boycotts to influence government are protected First Amendment activity)
Umbehr v. McClure, 518 U.S. 668 (application of Pickering framework to independent contractors)
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (balancing government interests and speaker's First Amendment rights)
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (distinguishing regulation of conduct that is not inherently expressive)
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (exemptions can undermine government's asserted rationale for restricting speech)
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (loss of First Amendment freedoms constitutes irreparable harm)
ACORN v. City of Tulsa, 835 F.2d 735 (facial First Amendment challenges need not seek administrative exemptions first)
Stout v. Kansas Judicial Review, 519 F.3d 1107 (relaxed ripeness test and hardship analysis in First Amendment context)
Verlo v. Martinez, 820 F.3d 1113 (Tenth Circuit preliminary injunction standard)
Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85 (voluntary cessation doctrine prevents defendants from mooting cases by temporary cessation)