Komisar v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore LLC
1:14-cv-07948
| N.D. Ill. | Jan 29, 2015Background
- Plaintiff Laurence Komisar (Northfield, IL) incurred a consumer debt to Capital One and was sued in state court.
- On August 21, 2013 defendant law firm Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC (BHLM) filed the collection complaint in the First Municipal District of Cook County (Chicago).
- Komisar resides in the Second Municipal District; he alleges BHLM violated the FDCPA venue provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1692i(2).
- A Cook County court entered an ex parte judgment against Komisar on October 10, 2013.
- Komisar filed this FDCPA suit on October 10, 2014 (one year and ~50 days after the August 21 filing).
- BHLM moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) as time-barred under the FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations, § 1692k(d).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When did the FDCPA § 1692i violation occur for statute-of-limitations purposes? | The violation (and limitations clock) began when the state-court judgment was entered (Oct. 10, 2013). | The violation occurred when defendant filed the improper-venue complaint (Aug. 21, 2013). | Court held the violation occurred when the collection action was filed in the improper forum (Aug. 21, 2013). |
| Does the continuing-violation doctrine restart the limitations period based on subsequent events (e.g., judgment)? | Komisar contended later events (judgment) produced the actionable injury. | BHLM argued later events do not restart the clock; injury occurred at filing. | Court held continuing-violation doctrine does not apply; subsequent prosecution/judgment did not toll or restart limitations. |
| Are § 1692i and § 1692k construed together such that "bring"/"action" mean filing? | Komisar urged a broader meaning for when an actionable violation occurs. | BHLM argued "bring"/"action" mean filing a complaint, consistent across the provisions. | Court read the provisions in pari materia and adopted the filing-based meaning. |
| Is dismissal at Rule 12(b)(6) appropriate on statute-of-limitations grounds? | Komisar argued his complaint stated a timely claim if measured from judgment. | BHLM urged the complaint’s own allegations show the claim is untimely. | Court granted dismissal with prejudice because the complaint revealed the claim was time-barred. |
Key Cases Cited
- Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 757 F.3d 636 (7th Cir.) (definition of relevant judicial district for § 1692i).
- Naas v. Stolman, 130 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 1997) (statute of limitations for FDCPA § 1692 claims begins at filing of the complaint).
- Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Village of Lemont, Ill., 520 F.3d 797 (7th Cir.) (limits on continuing-violation tolling; injury occurs at initial act).
- Logan v. Wilkins, 644 F.3d 577 (7th Cir.) (statute-of-limitations defense may be resolved on Rule 12(b)(6) when complaint shows it).
- Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2002) (alternative rule: limitations period begins at service).
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (standards for pleading and plausibility).
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading standard).
- Thulin v. Shopko Stores Operating Co., LLC, 771 F.3d 994 (7th Cir.) (treat plaintiff’s factual allegations as true on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion).
- United States v. Sanders, 708 F.3d 976 (7th Cir.) (in pari materia canon: statutes on same subject read together).
