Kolon Industries Incorporated v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Company
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 6161
4th Cir.2014Background
- Kolon sues DuPont for antitrust violations under §2 in the US para-aramid market, alleging monopoly power and anti-competitive supply agreements.
- The market is dominated by DuPont and Teijin (Kolon is a new entrant, 2005).
- Kolon showed DuPont’s market share declined from ~59% in 2006 to ~55% in 2009, with Teijin gaining share; the market is highly concentrated (DuPont+Teijin ~99%).
- Kolon alleged DuPont used multi-year exclusive supply agreements to foreclose high-volume customers and hinder Kolon’s entry.
- The district court granted summary judgment for DuPont on Kolon’s antitrust claims and denied Kolon’s discovery and recusal motions; Kolon appeals.
- Kolon’s recusal challenge centered on the district judge’s prior involvement in Akzo (the private Akzo litigation with Teijin’s predecessor) and timing of the motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Recusal timeliness under § 455(b)(2) | Kolon argues timeliness should not be required under § 455(b). | Court should require timely recusal motions; delay prejudice; Owens applies to § 455(a) and (b). | Timeliness implied under § 455(b); district court did not abuse denial on timeliness. |
| Discovery rulings on transaction-level data and Rule 30(b)(6) deposition | Kolon needed transaction-level data to prove foreclosure and margins. | Production would be unduly burdensome; data not proportionally useful. | District court’s discovery rulings affirmed; no abuse of discretion. |
| Monopolization under § 2 | DuPont possessed monopoly power and maintained it via long-term supply agreements. | DuPont lacked monopoly power and failed to foreclose sufficient market share. | DuPont did not have monopoly power during 2006–2009; no willful maintenance. |
| Attempted monopolization under § 2 | DuPont’s agreements created a dangerous probability of monopolization. | Evidence shows insufficient foreclosure and declining market power. | No dangerous probability; no attempted monopolization; summary judgment affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (monopoly power concept under Sherman Act §2)
- Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) (foreclosure of a substantial market share to be illegal)
- E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc. (DuPont I), 637 F.3d 435 (4th Cir. 2011) (monopoly power and foreclosure standards in de novo review)
- Owens, 902 F.2d 1154 (4th Cir. 1990) (timeliness of recusal motions discussed across § 455 subsections)
- United States v. Lindsey, 556 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2009) (recusal standards under § 455(b) discussed in context)