361 F. Supp. 3d 14
D.C. Cir.2019Background
- Koi Nation is a landless federally recognized tribe that was effectively treated as terminated by the United States from ~1956 until DOI corrected an administrative error and reaffirmed recognition in 2000.
- Because the tribe lacked land and revenues, it sought to qualify for IGRA’s "restored lands" exception (25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(B)(iii))—requests made in 2006, 2009, and 2014—so it could have land taken into trust and conduct gaming.
- DOI promulgated implementing regulations for IGRA §20 in 2008 (25 C.F.R. pt. 292), and §292.10(b) limited administrative “restoration” to recognition obtained through the Part 83 Federal Acknowledgment Process.
- DOI denied Koi Nation’s 2014 request in a January 19, 2017 decision, applying §292.10(b) and concluding Koi was not a “restored” tribe for IGRA purposes. Koi sued under the APA and IRA §5123(f).
- The central legal questions were (1) whether IGRA’s phrase “restored to Federal recognition” unambiguously covers tribes like Koi that were de facto terminated and later reaffirmed outside Part 83; and (2) whether DOI’s regulation and application unlawfully diminished Koi’s privileges relative to similarly situated tribes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether IGRA’s term “restored to Federal recognition” covers tribes mistakenly treated as terminated and later reaffirmed administratively outside Part 83 | Koi: "restored" means returned to a former/proper status; DOI’s 2000 reaffirmation restored Koi and fits IGRA’s text, purpose, and structure | DOI: statute ambiguous; "restored" should be limited to Part 83 administrative recognition (or Congress/courts/Legislature) | Court: "restored" unambiguously covers Koi as applied; §292.10(b) invalid as applied and vacated |
| Whether Chevron deference allows DOI to limit "restored" to Part 83 despite ambiguity | Koi: even if ambiguous, Indian canon requires resolving ambiguity in tribe’s favor; deference is muted | DOI: its interpretation is reasonable and entitled to deference | Court: even if Chevron applied, Indian canon and statutory purpose counsel for Koi; DOI’s narrower reading rejected |
| Whether §292.10(b) and DOI’s 2017 application violated IRA §5123(f) (privileges and immunities) by treating Koi differently from similarly situated tribes | Koi: DOI’s rule and application create a forbidden distinction among recognized tribes and disadvantage Koi relative to tribes like Ione and Grand Traverse | DOI: gaming privileges are not covered or Koi is not similarly situated; grandfathering and timing justify differences | Court: §5123(f) covers gaming-related privileges; Koi is similarly situated to other de facto-terminated-and-restored tribes; DOI violated §5123(f); decision vacated |
| Whether DOI provided a reasoned explanation for changing its prior approach in promulgating §292.10(b) | Koi: DOI failed to justify excluding reaffirmed tribes and relied on post-hoc rationales; explanations (relying on Part 83’s existence and the 1994 List Act) are inadequate | DOI: explained reliance on Part 83’s centrality and List Act notes | Court: DOI’s final rule explanation was deficient and arbitrary and capricious as applied to Koi |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Roseville v. Norton, 348 F.3d 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (interpreting IGRA §20 exceptions and purpose)
- TOMAC v. Norton, 433 F.3d 852 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (definition of "restore" and restored-tribe analysis under IGRA)
- Grand Traverse Band v. Office of U.S. Atty., 369 F.3d 960 (6th Cir. 2004) (executive-branch de facto termination and restoration recognized for IGRA)
- County of Amador v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 872 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2017) (Ione Band: restored-status analysis and grandfathering under IGRA regs)
- Butte County v. Chaudhuri, 887 F.3d 501 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (purpose of IGRA exceptions to avoid disadvantaging landless tribes)
- Muwekma Ohlone Tribe v. Salazar, 708 F.3d 209 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (agency discretion and Part 83 distinctions)
- Citizens Exposing Truth About Casinos v. Kempthorne, 492 F.3d 460 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (applying Indian canon in IGRA context)
- Cobell v. Salazar, 573 F.3d 808 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Indian canon and agency deference principles)
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (U.S. 1983) (arbitrary and capricious standard)
- Sugar Cane Growers Co-op. of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (vacatur remedy for unlawful agency action)
Disposition: Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment granted; DOI’s cross-motion denied; DOI’s January 19, 2017 decision and 25 C.F.R. §292.10(b) (as applied to Koi) vacated.