228 A.3d 920
Pa. Super. Ct.2020Background:
- Decedent was discharged from a Pittsburgh hospital and admitted to Highland Park Care Center on 1/31/2017; she executed a separate two-page "Agreement to Arbitrate Disputes" at admission and died about three months later.
- The Arbitration Agreement covered disputes arising from admission and nursing facility services, included a fee‑splitting provision for arbitrator fees, and stated it was not a condition of admission and could be rescinded within ten days.
- Plaintiff (decedent’s administratrix) sued for negligence, survival, and wrongful death, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.
- Defendants filed preliminary objections seeking to compel arbitration; the trial court denied them, finding the arbitration agreement unconscionable/procured by duress (particularly given decedent’s frailty) and ruled wrongful death claims need not be arbitrated.
- The record before the trial court contained no discovery about the circumstances of signing (decedent’s condition, presence of others, admission packet contents, payment ability), and the appellate court found the record insufficiently developed on unconscionability.
- The Superior Court affirmed refusal to compel arbitration of the wrongful death claim, vacated the denial as to the survival claim, and remanded for discovery and further factfinding on unconscionability of the arbitration agreement.
Issues:
| Issue | Kohlman (Plaintiff) | Grane (Defendants) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether wrongful death claim is subject to arbitration | Wrongful death action is independent and cannot be bound by decedent’s arbitration clause | Arbitration agreement covers all disputes arising from admission and care | Wrongful death claim not subject to arbitration; trial court affirmed |
| Whether the survival action must be arbitrated (validity/enforceability of arbitration agreement) | Agreement is unconscionable and procured by duress given decedent’s frail/ill condition | Agreement is valid and enforceable under FAA and state law defenses are preempted except generally applicable defenses | Record undeveloped; appellate court vacated trial court’s ruling and remanded for factual development on unconscionability |
| Whether the fee‑splitting clause renders the agreement unenforceable | Fee‑splitting is onerous, deters access to arbitration, supports unconscionability | Fee‑splitting is a contractual allocation of administrative costs and does not bar arbitration | Merits not decided; remand ordered to develop facts bearing on unconscionability, including fee impact |
| Whether discovery was required before ruling on arbitrability/unconscionability | Discovery necessary to develop facts (decedent’s condition, packet contents, alternatives, economic constraints) | Preliminary objection could be resolved on the record | Court held discovery/factfinding necessary and remanded for development of the record |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., 147 A.3d 490 (Pa. 2016) (explains FAA preemption, savings clause, and directs remand to develop record on generally applicable contract defenses)
- Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530 (2012) (per curiam) (state categorical rules barring arbitration of nursing‑home negligence preempted by FAA)
- Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (federal policy strongly favors arbitration)
- Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (state laws that single out arbitration clauses for special treatment are preempted; general contract defenses remain available)
- Salley v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 925 A.2d 115 (Pa. 2007) (unconscionability is fact‑sensitive; courts should allow factual development on commercial setting, purpose, and effect)
- Pisano v. Extendicare Homes, Inc., 77 A.3d 651 (Pa. Super. 2013) (wrongful death claims are independent and may not be bound by decedent’s arbitration agreement)
- Griest v. Griest, 183 A.3d 1015 (Pa. Super. 2018) (discusses construction and enforcement principles for arbitration agreements)
