Koe v. Commissioner of Probation, SJC 12160

In 1995 Kristi Koe was convicted (offenses from 1990) of rape and indecent assault of a child; SORB classified her as a level two sex offender in 2003 and she began registering in 2003.
Koe petitioned SORB in 2013 for reclassification and relief from registration; the SORB panel found she posed no cognizable risk of reoffense but concluded she was statutorily ineligible for relief because of her historic "sexually violent offense" classification and ordered her as level one to register.
Koe obtained a Superior Court ruling (and preliminary injunction earlier) that SORB’s relief-from-registration order was improper; SORB did not appeal and Koe was ultimately relieved of the duty to register.
After being relieved from registration, Koe petitioned to seal her record under G. L. c. 276, § 100A; the Commissioner denied the petition because § 100A(6) (as amended in 2010) bars sealing for any person who has at any time been classified as level two or three.
Koe sued, arguing § 100A(6), as applied to her, is retroactive and violates due process; the SJC reserved and reported the matter and ultimately held § 100A(6) is retroactive and, as applied to Koe’s circumstances, unreasonable and unconstitutional under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 100A(6) operates retroactively as applied to Koe	Koe: the statute attaches new legal consequences (permanent bar to sealing) to her past classification	Defs: not retroactive because Koe was not eligible to seal at enactment; no new consequence	The statute is retroactive under the "new legal consequences" test and applies to Koe
Whether retroactive application violates due process (reasonableness)	Koe: application is unreasonable given SORB and court findings she poses no risk and has been relieved of registration; violates reliance and rehabilitation interests	Defs: statute serves public safety and employers’ interests; part of legislative recalibration and procedural protections justify retroactive effect	As-applied, retroactive application is unreasonable and violates due process; § 100A(6) cannot be enforced against Koe
Proper framework for retroactivity analysis	Koe: rely on "new legal consequences" analysis (and reliance on prior law)	Defs: argue for vested-rights test (no vested right to sealing before statutory period)	Court reaffirms "new legal consequences" test and rejects reverting to vested-rights test
Scope of remedy	Koe: seeks sealing relief for her record	Defs: enforcement of § 100A(6) to deny sealing	Court orders that § 100A(6) not be enforced against Koe and remands for entry of order in her favor

Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 467 Mass. 598 (discusses "new legal consequences" retroactivity test and retroactive registry consequences)
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 8725 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 450 Mass. 780 (held certain retroactive registry requirements unreasonable; sets burden and reasonableness framework)
Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 Mass. 296 (describing 2010 sealing/regulatory overhaul and balance between public safety and reintegration)
American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 374 Mass. 181 (reasonableness factors for retroactive statutes)
Sliney v. Previte, 473 Mass. 283 (consideration of duration and scope when assessing retroactivity burdens)
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (Supreme Court exposition of retroactivity principles)
Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257 (on retroactivity and reliance considerations)
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (discusses burdens when former offenders demonstrate rehabilitation)
Leibovich v. Antonellis, 410 Mass. 568 (reasonable reliance on prior state of law in retroactivity analysis)