Kobold v. Good Samaritan Regional Medical Center
832 F.3d 1024
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Consolidated three Ninth Circuit appeals (Kobold v. Good Samaritan; Barr v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel; Allen v. Northwest Permanente) involving union-represented employees who filed state-law claims after grievance/arbitration did not provide full relief.
- Each dispute involved a CBA with a mandatory grievance/arbitration procedure; defendants removed to federal court asserting § 301 LMRA preemption; district courts denied remand and granted summary judgment in part.
- Kobold: operating-room nurse sought additional retroactive premium pay beyond a 45-day amount the union settled; employer paid under CBA settlement but refused further retroactive pay; sued under ORS §§ 652.120 and 652.615.
- Barr: truck drivers alleged employer deducted payroll contributions for health insurance but failed to remit them to the benefits fund (OTET), causing lapse of coverage; pleaded ORS §§ 652.610/652.615, breach of fiduciary duty, and money had and received; CBA required monthly contributions but was silent on exact remittance timing.
- Allen: nurse practitioner lost credentials after a KPNW Credentials Committee recommendation; union arbitrated, arbitrator treated the Committee’s action as a de facto termination and applied the CBA’s just-cause standard, vacated the decision; Allen sued third-party NWP in state court for interference, defamation, and related claims; removal premised on § 301 preemption.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ORS §§ 652.120 and 652.615 claims (Kobold) are preempted by § 301 | Kobold: statutes create independent wage-rights so state-law claim can proceed | Good Samaritan: resolving which shifts qualify for premium pay requires interpreting CBA terms (agreement exception) and is therefore preempted | Held: Preempted — resolving which shifts entitled to premium pay requires interpretation of the CBA; Kobold also failed to exhaust grievance/arbitration or allege unfair representation, so § 301 suit cannot proceed |
| Whether ORS § 652.610(4) claim (timely remittance) is preempted (Barr) | Barr: § 652.610(4) supplies independent timing rule (7 days) when CBA is silent; claim is calendar-based and independent of CBA | RISG: resolution requires interpreting multiple CBA provisions and is therefore preempted | Held: Not preempted — analogous to Livadas; statute supplies timing rule independent of the CBA; remanded for district court to consider supplemental jurisdiction and ERISA preemption |
| Whether breach of fiduciary duty claim (Barr) is preempted | Barr: statutory fiduciary duties (ORS 652.710/652.720) create independent duties, not dependent on CBA | RISG: fiduciary issues tied to CBA obligations and thus preempted | Held: Not preempted — duties arise from state statute and do not substantially depend on CBA interpretation |
| Whether money had and received claim (Barr) is preempted | Barr: equitable restitution available because employer withheld employee funds | RISG: right to collect/deduct and apply funds derives from the CBA, so claim is contract-based and preempted | Held: Preempted — claim is rooted in contractual (CBA) entitlements; plaintiff did not exhaust remedies or allege union breach, so claim dismissed |
| Whether Allen’s state-law claims (interference, defamation, etc.) are preempted given arbitration outcome | Allen: credentialing process and Committee are outside the CBA’s scope; claims arise independently under state law | NWP: arbitrator concluded Committee’s action was a de facto termination and subject to CBA just-cause standard, so plaintiff’s claims arise under the CBA and are preempted | Held: Preempted — arbitrator interpreted that the Committee’s action fell within the CBA; Allen cannot relitigate that interpretation; non-defamation claims preempted; defamation claim was timely-barred so summary judgment for defendant affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (§ 301 requires federal courts to fashion federal common law for labor-contract disputes)
- Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (preemption extends beyond contract suits to state-law claims requiring CBA interpretation)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (state-law claims that are ‘founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements’ are preempted)
- Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994) (statutory, calendar-based remedies can be independent of a CBA and not preempted)
- Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (two-step test for § 301 preemption: independent right and substantial dependence on CBA)
- Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing limits of § 301 preemption and role of arbitration)
- United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (industrial common law is part of CBA interpretation)
- Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) (federal common law preempts state contract law in CBA interpretation)
- United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987) (arbitrator’s interpretation is given great deference and limits judicial review)