Kobobel v. STATE DEPT. OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 249 P.3d 1127

Well owners own thirteen decreed irrigation wells in Morgan County (South Platte River basin) with appropriation dates 1945–1966.
In 2006, Water Division 1 issued cease and desist orders prohibiting pumping until augmentation plans were approved; other plans could continue.
Owners complied, claiming cessation renders farming operations essentially worthless and seeking compensation for a takings in inverse condemnation.
Initial inverse condemnation suit filed in Morgan County; water court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; court of appeals affirmed; case proceeded directly to Colorado Supreme Court under section 13-4-102(1)(d).
Water court held the owners’ rights to water use are subject to prior appropriation; cessation curtailed out-of-priority use consistent with long-standing law; no taking occurred.
Dispute centers on whether the claim is a water matter within water court’s exclusive jurisdiction or a general ownership takings claim to be heard in district court.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the water court has exclusive jurisdiction over inverse condemnation claims arising from water use.	Kobobel argues district court proper for ownership takings.	State contends water matters fall under water court jurisdiction.	Water court has exclusive jurisdiction.
Whether the State's cease-and-desist orders constituted a taking requiring just compensation.	Owners seek compensation for loss of use of water and land.	Orders curtailed out-of-priority use; no taking under Colorado/Federal constitutions.	No taking occurred.
Whether pre-1969 vested rights and the 1969 Act preserve ownership/priority in groundwater.	Pre-1969 appropriations are vested rights preserved by the 1969 Act.	Rights remain subject to prior appropriation and injurious effect doctrine.	1969 Act preserves but does not exempt from prior appropriation; no unfettered right to use water.
Whether the water court properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(5) without an evidentiary hearing.	Should have an evidentiary hearing on takings.	Dismissal proper as plaintiffs cannot prove a set of facts to support a taking.	No evidentiary hearing required; dismissal proper.
Whether the cease-and-desist orders were a change in enforcement or a change in law constituting a taking.	Enforcement delayed for decades; constitutes regulatory taking.	Change in enforcement to enforce long-standing doctrine; not a taking.	Enforcement change, not a taking.

Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139 (Colo. 2001) (explicates water rights and augmentation context under prior appropriation)
Bijou Irrigation Co. v. Bijou, 69 P.3d 50 (Colo. 2003) (court decisions on augmentation and out-of-priority depletions; integration into priority system)
Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374 (Colo. 1982) (defines nature of water rights as usufructuary and subject to priority)
In re Tonko, 154 P.3d 397 (Colo. 2007) (water courts have exclusive jurisdiction over water matters; ancillary claims permitted)
Crystal Lakes Water & Sewer Ass'n v. Backlund, 908 P.2d 534 (Colo. 1996) (water court jurisdiction extends to ancillary non-water issues)