Knoll v. Olathe School District No. 233
116167
| Kan. Ct. App. | Jun 23, 2017Background
- Helen Knoll injured her knee/hip in October 2009 while employed by Olathe School District No. 233 and received ongoing treatment.
- At injury date, K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 44-523(f) required dismissal for lack of prosecution if a claim did not proceed to final hearing (or settlement/agreed award) within 5 years of filing an application for hearing; a motion to extend for good cause had to be filed before that 5-year deadline.
- In May 2011 the statute was amended, shortening the deadline from 5 years to 3 years (K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 44-523(f)(1)), with the same requirement that extension motions be filed before the deadline.
- Knoll filed her application for hearing on November 14, 2011 (after the amendment); the employer moved to dismiss for lack of prosecution under the 3-year rule in February 2015; Knoll filed an extension motion on March 4, 2015.
- The ALJ and the Workers Compensation Board applied the 5-year rule in effect at the time of Knoll’s injury, denied dismissal, and an award issued to Knoll. The District appealed, arguing the 3-year amendment retroactively applied and required dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Knoll) | Defendant's Argument (District) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which version of K.S.A. 44-523(f) governs Knoll’s claim (date-of-injury vs. date-of-filing trigger)? | The 2009 statute (5-year) applies because the claimant’s rights are fixed by law at time of injury. | The filing date should control and the 2011 amendment (3-year) applies because both versions reference the application-for-hearing filing date and amendments. | Court rejected the filing-date trigger argument; date of injury controls which version applies when statute changes the rule’s nature. |
| Whether the 2011 amendment (shortening 5→3 years) applies retroactively to Knoll, who was injured in 2009 but filed in 2011 | The 2011 amendment should not apply retroactively; claimant relies on Welty that substantive rights at time of injury govern. | The amendment is procedural (changes enforcement mechanics) and therefore may be applied retroactively. | Court held the 2011 amendment is procedural and may be applied retroactively; it did not impair substantive/vested rights here. |
| Was Knoll’s March 4, 2015 extension motion timely under the controlling statute? | Under the 5-year rule her motion was timely. | Under the 3-year rule her motion was untimely. | Under the court’s application of the 3-year rule retroactively, Knoll’s motion was untimely and dismissal was required. |
| Did the ALJ/Board have authority to proceed to final hearing after denying dismissal? | Yes, because they applied the 5-year rule. | No, because the 3-year amendment applies and bars the claim. | Court reversed: ALJ lacked authority once the 3-year rule is applied retrospectively; remanded with directions to dismiss. |
Key Cases Cited
- Welty v. U.S.D. No. 259, 48 Kan. App. 2d 797 (2012) (held statute creating dismissal-for-lack-of-prosecution could not be applied retroactively where it established new substantive limitation)
- Fernandez v. McDonald's, 296 Kan. 472 (2013) (appellate review of statutory interpretation is unlimited and agency deference is not required)
- Hoesli v. Triplett, Inc., 303 Kan. 358 (2015) (when statute is plain and unambiguous courts give effect to express language)
- Norris v. Kansas Employment Security Bd. of Review, 303 Kan. 834 (2016) (statutes operate prospectively unless clear retroactive intent or the change is procedural/remedial)
- Brennan v. Kansas Insurance Guaranty Ass'n, 293 Kan. 446 (2011) (retroactive application prohibited if it prejudicially affects substantive or vested rights)
- Rios v. Board of Public Utilities of Kansas City, 256 Kan. 184 (1994) (distinguishes procedural rules from substantive rights)