KNAPPER v. STATE, 473 P.3d 1053

Background

Appellant James Edward Knapper (age 14 at offense) was tried in Tulsa County for first-degree murder, assault and battery with a deadly weapon, and a gang-related offense arising from a July 17, 2015 drive-by shooting that killed Deouijanea Terry and wounded Jerome Bledsoe.
Key evidence: eyewitness ID by Bledsoe, latent fingerprints on the van’s sliding door matching Knapper, .40 and 9mm shell casings (ballistics linked .40 casings from scene and van), Snapchat videos, and inculpatory statements to third parties; Knapper fled to Wichita and was arrested.
Prosecution read preliminary hearing testimony of witness Roshawn Banks after the court found him unavailable; Banks had earlier described co-defendants’ admissions and bragging by participants.
Trial counsel pursued a strategy—agreed pretrial with Knapper—to concede culpability to preserve credibility for sentencing (seek life with parole); Knapper later testified and proclaimed innocence; counsel’s first-stage closing was contested on appeal as an unauthorized concession.
Appellant raised multiple appellate propositions (ineffective assistance, Confrontation Clause, evidentiary rulings, Bruton/Crawford issues, double jeopardy, sentencing), the court held an evidentiary hearing on the concession claim, and ultimately affirmed convictions and sentences.

Issues

Issue	Appellant's Argument	State's Argument	Held
1. Counsel ineffective for not seeking youthful-offender certification	Counsel should have sought reverse certification to juvenile court given Knapper's age	Statute presumes 13–14-year-olds charged with 1st-degree murder be treated as adults; record (violent facts, prior juvenile contacts) favored adult certification; counsel’s choice reasonable	Denied — no Strickland deficiency or prejudice shown; facts supported adult prosecution
2. Confrontation Clause: admission of Banks’s preliminary testimony	Banks was not shown unavailable/diligence inadequate; preliminary hearing cross was insufficient; redactions omitted defense-relevant cross	State made good-faith, reasonable efforts; Banks unavailable; defense had adequate opportunity to cross at preliminary hearing; omissions not prejudicial	Denied — admission complied with Crawford (unavailability + prior opportunity); no plain error
3. Counsel ineffective for failing to use non-record evidence to challenge Banks’s availability/credibility	Trial counsel failed to use docket entries, interviews, and other materials to show bad faith and insufficient diligence	The trial court had access to relevant docket info; nothing in non-record evidence showed a strong possibility of ineffectiveness warranting evidentiary hearing	Denied — claims waived or failed clear-and-convincing threshold for remand
4. Counsel conceded guilt in closing without client consent (McCoy claim)	Closing effectively admitted guilt; Knapper did not consent and later repudiated the strategy when he testified	Counsel developed and obtained consent to concession strategy pretrial; Knapper later changed course by testifying; closing did not explicitly concede guilt and fell within counsel’s strategic authority	Denied — evidentiary hearing found no clear express or implied concession without acquiescence; analyzed under Strickland and Florida v. Nixon fallback

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (testimonial hearsay and Confrontation Clause requirements)
McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018) (defendant’s right to insist counsel not concede guilt)
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (unavailability and good-faith effort to procure witness attendance)
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (prosecution must make good-faith efforts to obtain witness)
Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004) (concession strategy with client acquiescence analyzed under Strickland)
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (same-elements test for double jeopardy)
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983) (legislative authorization can permit cumulative punishments)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial warnings)