Knapp v. Ruser
297 Neb. 639
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Patricia Knapp was a longtime supervising attorney in the University of Nebraska College of Law civil clinic who transitioned from half‑time to full‑time in 2011; her position was a temporary lecturer / special appointment not eligible for tenure.
- Knapp learned a male clinician hired in 2012 earned substantially more and complained to Director Kevin Ruser about alleged gender pay/classification inequities; the parties’ relationship deteriorated and Knapp left employment in May 2013.
- Knapp originally filed federal and state claims; the federal district court dismissed federal claims on summary judgment and remanded four state law claims to Lancaster County District Court (claims 4, 5, 7, 9 in the operative complaint).
- In state court the defendants moved for summary judgment; the court applied McDonnell Douglas framework (and federal analogues) and granted summary judgment on the four remanded state claims: wage discrimination (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48‑1221(1)), NFEPA sex discrimination (§ 48‑1104), NFEPA retaliation (§ 48‑1114), and a public‑policy retaliation claim.
- The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed: it held Knapp failed to present prima facie evidence of similarly situated male comparators for discrimination/wage claims and failed to show a materially adverse employment action for retaliation or public‑policy discharge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Knapp stated an improper classification/disparate treatment claim under the NFEPA (§ 48‑1104(2)) | Knapp argued she was classified/segregated so as to deny tenure/opportunity and pay compared to male colleagues | Defendants argued comparators had materially different duties and some were tenure‑eligible; no proof Knapp applied for or was promised tenure | Court: No error — treated under McDonnell Douglas; Knapp failed to identify similarly situated male comparators, so no prima facie claim |
| Whether Knapp proved wage discrimination under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48‑1221(1) (EPA analogue) | Knapp argued male clinicians earned more for comparable clinic work | Defendants: male comparators had additional, substantially different duties (research, admin, outreach); jobs not substantially equal | Court: Affirmed summary judgment — jobs not substantially equal; no prima facie equal‑work showing |
| Whether Knapp proved retaliation under the NFEPA (§ 48‑1114) | Knapp claimed protected complaints led to hostile conduct that forced her resignation | Defendants: alleged slights/withdrawal were minor, not materially adverse; no adverse employment action shown | Court: Affirmed — conduct was petty/insubstantial and would not deter a reasonable worker; no materially adverse action shown |
| Whether Knapp’s public‑policy retaliation claim (tort‑based) was actionable | Knapp asserted ethical concerns about clinic management implicate public policy and support retaliatory‑discharge/demotion claim | Defendants: no discharge, demotion, or constructive discharge; conduct insufficient to trigger public‑policy exception | Court: Affirmed — even under Trosper public‑policy exception applies to discharge/demotion; no adverse action shown |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (sets prima facie framework for disparate treatment)
- Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (retaliation: materially adverse standard for retaliation claims)
- Trosper v. Bag ’N Save, 273 Neb. 855 (Neb. 2007) (public‑policy exception to at‑will employment limited to clear mandates and typically applied to discharge/demotion)
- Hartley v. Metropolitan Util. Dist., 294 Neb. 870 (Neb. 2016) (NFEPA interpreted with guidance from federal Title VII jurisprudence)
- Hunt v. Nebraska Public Power Dist., 282 F.3d 1021 (8th Cir.) (EPA equal‑work/substantial equality analysis)
- Price v. Northern States Power Co., 664 F.3d 1186 (8th Cir.) (outlines prima facie elements for Equal Pay Act claims)
- Jackson v. Morris Communications Corp., 265 Neb. 423 (Neb. 2003) (recognized public‑policy exception in context of workers’ compensation retaliation)