Background
In 2004 Brooke Knapp (represented by attorney Larry Ginsberg) and Grant Tinker signed a premarital agreement (PMA) governing ownership and testamentary disposition of their home (Perugia). Tinker’s business manager, non‑attorney Sidney Tessler, negotiated and initialed the PMA for Tinker; no attorney signed on Tinker’s behalf and Tinker did not sign the separate written waiver of independent counsel required by Family Code §1615.
The PMA contained boilerplate warranties that each party had independent counsel and had been advised of the agreement’s consequences.
Over the years Tinker executed multiple trust amendments (including Second, Fifth, and Sixth Amended Trusts and a short‑lived Residence Trust) addressing the Perugia property; some amendments referenced the PMA or sought to implement/modify its terms.
Tinker died in 2016; Knapp sold Perugia in 2017, paid off the ~$3.9M mortgage, filed a creditor’s claim and suit against the estate, and ultimately settled with Tinker’s children under terms less favorable than the PMA.
Knapp sued Ginsberg for legal malpractice alleging his failure to obtain Tinker’s separate written waiver (or otherwise ensure compliance with §1615) rendered the PMA unenforceable and caused her damages; the trial court granted summary judgment for Ginsberg on the ground Tinker ratified the PMA via trust amendments.
The Court of Appeal reversed: it held (1) a triable factual issue exists whether Tinker had independent counsel when signing the PMA, and (2) a premarital agreement that fails §1615 is void (not voidable) and therefore cannot be ratified as a matter of law, so summary judgment based on ratification was erroneous.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tinker was represented by independent counsel when he signed the PMA | Knapp: Tinker lacked counsel and did not sign the written waiver required by §1615 | Ginsberg: PMA warranties and later conduct show Tinker had counsel; no evidence he was unrepresented | Triable issue of material fact — summary judgment inappropriate on this threshold fact |
| Whether a PMA that fails §1615 is void or merely voidable/ratifiable | Knapp: Noncompliance with §1615 renders the PMA void and not subject to ratification | Ginsberg: Involuntary agreements are voidable and may be ratified by subsequent consent (Civil Code §1588) | Court of Appeal: PMAs failing §1615 are not enforceable and are void for public policy reasons; they cannot be ratified |
| Whether Tinker’s later trust amendments ratified/cured any §1615 defect | Knapp: The trust amendments sought to modify the PMA and did not constitute ratification; triable issue exists | Ginsberg: Trust amendments repeatedly acknowledged and implemented the PMA, curing any defect | Court: Did not decide whether the amendments constituted ratification because, as a matter of law, ratification cannot validate a PMA void under §1615 |
| Whether Knapp’s malpractice claim was time‑barred | Knapp: Statute of limitations tolled by continued representation, lack of actual injury until estate refused lien, and a tolling agreement with Ginsberg | Ginsberg: Malpractice accrued in 2004 (or at latest when Knapp sold the house in Feb 2017); claim is time‑barred | Court: Issues of tolling, continuing representation, date of actual injury, and the signed tolling agreement preclude summary judgment on statute‑of‑limitations grounds |
Key Cases Cited
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 25 Cal.4th 826 (summary judgment standard and evidence viewed in plaintiff’s favor)
- In re Marriage of Clarke & Akel, 19 Cal.App.5th 914 (boilerplate PMA warranties do not conclusively establish statutory prerequisites for §1615)
- In re Marriage of Bonds, 24 Cal.4th 1 (background on voluntariness inquiry in premarital agreements prompting statutory reform)
- Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 62 Cal.4th 919 (discussion of ratification and validation of defective transactions)
- Viner v. Sweet, 30 Cal.4th 1232 (causation standard in legal malpractice — but for a more favorable outcome)
- Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phlegar & Harrison, 18 Cal.4th 739 (actual injury requirement for malpractice accrual)