14 F.4th 723
D.C. Cir.2021Background
- Since 1998 FMCSA has maintained MCMIS, a database of commercial-driver crash and inspection records; in 2010–12 FMCSA created the Pre‑Employment Screening Program (PSP) to provide certain MCMIS records to prospective employers under the SAFE Transportation Act (49 U.S.C. § 31150).
- SAFE § 31150 requires FMCSA to release specified MCMIS reports only if (1) releases are made in accordance with FCRA and other law, (2) the driver consents in writing, (3) the screener won’t re‑disclose the information, and (4) a driver‑correction procedure is provided (implemented as DataQs forwarding challenges to states).
- Mowrer and Weaver had state citations reported to MCMIS, later dismissed by state courts; states declined to remove the records; the drivers authorized PSP disclosures and then sued, alleging FMCSA violated FCRA duties (reasonable procedures for accuracy, reinvestigation on dispute, and adding statements of dispute) and seeking damages.
- The district court dismissed, holding FMCSA is not a “consumer reporting agency” under FCRA; appeal raised (1) whether FCRA waives federal sovereign immunity for damages claims and (2) whether FMCSA is a consumer reporting agency when it disclose MCMIS/PSP records; district court also denied a late motion to add Privacy Act claims for undue delay/waiver.
- The D.C. Circuit affirmed: it held FCRA waives federal sovereign immunity, but FMCSA is not a consumer reporting agency in operating MCMIS/PSP (the agency assembles/evaluates records for safety regulation and enforcement, not for furnishing consumer reports), and it upheld the denial of leave to amend Privacy Act claims for undue delay/waiver.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether FCRA waives federal sovereign immunity for private damages claims | FCRA’s damages provisions apply to “any person,” and FCRA defines “person” to include governments, so the statute clearly waives immunity | Congress did not unmistakably consent; specific provisions (e.g., § 626) targeting federal agencies show Congress did not intend a general waiver | Court: FCRA’s text and structure (damages provisions + definition of “person”) clearly waive federal sovereign immunity |
| Whether FMCSA is a “consumer reporting agency” when it releases MCMIS/PSP records | FMCSA assembles and furnishes driver safety information to third parties (PSP) for employment screening, so it regularly assembles/evaluates information for furnishing consumer reports | FMCSA assembles/evaluates MCMIS data to perform safety regulatory and enforcement functions; SAFE merely requires limited disclosure of records already assembled for regulatory purposes, not assembly/evaluation for furnishing reports | Court: FMCSA is not a consumer reporting agency here because its assembly/evaluation is for safety regulation/enforcement, not for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties |
| Whether SAFE Act disclosure obligations convert FMCSA into a CRA under FCRA | SAFE’s incorporation of FCRA requirements shows Congress intended FMCSA to comply with FCRA duties when releasing records | SAFE tracks several FCRA-like requirements but is best read as imposing compliance obligations on FMCSA without converting FMCSA into a private‑style CRA; avoiding surplusage favors that reading | Court: SAFE’s FCRA‑like conditions are meaningful limits on FMCSA disclosures but do not make FMCSA a consumer reporting agency under FCRA |
| Whether district court properly denied leave to amend to add Privacy Act claims | Plaintiffs should be allowed to add Privacy Act claims given previous court statements and the substantive importance of correction remedies | Plaintiffs unduly delayed, omitted the claims from the consolidated complaint, and waived them; allowing amendment would prejudice the government and prolong protracted litigation | Court: Denial was permissible — plaintiffs unduly delayed and waived omitted Privacy Act claims; district court did not err |
Key Cases Cited
- Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007) (describing FCRA’s purposes and framework)
- FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284 (2012) (statutory waivers of sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed)
- FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature; waiver is prerequisite to suit)
- Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (courts must resolve jurisdictional questions before the merits)
- Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014) (statutory standing is a merits question separate from Article III jurisdiction)
- Bormes v. United States, 759 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 2014) (held FCRA waives federal sovereign immunity)
- Daniel v. Nat’l Park Serv., 891 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluded FCRA does not waive federal sovereign immunity)
- Robinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 917 F.3d 799 (4th Cir. 2019) (concluded FCRA does not waive federal sovereign immunity)
- Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007) (personal‑jurisdiction sequencing; courts may decide certain issues in flexible order)
- Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (limits on Congress’s power to abrogate state sovereign immunity)
- City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (punitive damages against government require clear congressional authorization)