211 Conn.App. 708
Conn. App. Ct.2022Background
- On July 13, 2012, Newton Carroll (d/b/a Elm City Kettle Corn) was towing a trailer with kettle‑corn equipment when the trailer detached and struck Michael Kling, causing serious injuries.
- Carroll and Elm City were insured under a Hartford business liability policy that promised to defend suits for covered bodily injury.
- Hartford declined to defend, invoking an auto exclusion that barred coverage for bodily injury "arising out of" ownership, maintenance, use, or entrustment of any "auto," defined to include trailers and attached equipment.
- Kling obtained a default judgment against Carroll and Elm City, then sued Hartford under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a‑321 for breach of contract (duty to defend) and asserted two extra‑contractual counts.
- The trial court (after a bench trial on a stipulated record) held the auto exclusion applied and dismissed the remaining counts for lack of standing/privity; Kling appealed.
- The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding the auto exclusion unambiguously precluded coverage and Hartford had no duty to defend.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hartford had a duty to defend under the policy given the auto exclusion | Kling: complaint allegations could fall within coverage; policy ambiguous so ambiguous terms must be construed for coverage | Hartford: auto exclusion plainly bars coverage because injuries arose out of use of truck, trailer, and attached equipment (all defined as "auto") | Held: No duty to defend; auto exclusion unambiguously applies |
| Whether factual or legal uncertainty created ambiguity triggering a duty to defend | Kling: allegations about improper securing/maintenance could be non‑auto negligence, so factual uncertainty exists | Hartford: exclusion covers ownership, maintenance, use (including loading/unloading); allegations tied to transportation/use | Held: No factual or legal uncertainty; complaint alleged injuries arising from vehicle use, so exclusion applies |
| Whether kettle‑corn equipment could be treated as "mobile equipment" to avoid exclusion | Kling: kettle‑corn gear may be "mobile equipment," creating legal uncertainty | Hartford: policy defines mobile equipment narrowly; equipment also fits auto definition as "attached machinery or equipment" to a trailer; transportation of mobile equipment is excluded | Held: Equipment falls within auto definition (and transportation exclusion in any event); no uncertainty |
| Whether Kling could pursue extra‑contractual counts (standing/privity) | Kling: pursued breach of implied covenant and negligent infliction after insurer's refusal to defend | Hartford: Kling lacks privity; §38a‑321 gives direct action rights tied to insurer‑insured relationship | Held: Counts two and three dismissed for lack of standing/privity (Kling conceded loss of count one disposes of others) |
Key Cases Cited
- Hogle v. Hogle, 167 Conn. 572 (1975) ("arising out of" in auto exclusions construed broadly to bar coverage when injury is connected with vehicle use)
- New London Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nantes, 303 Conn. 737 (2012) (applies Hogle: injuries that originate in or flow from vehicle use are excluded)
- Nash Street, LLC v. Main Street Am. Assurance Co., 337 Conn. 1 (2020) (distinguishes factual vs. legal uncertainty in assessing policy ambiguity for duty to defend)
- Misiti, LLC v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 308 Conn. 146 (2013) (duty to defend is determined by allegations in the underlying complaint)
- Warzecha v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 206 Conn. App. 188 (2021) (insurance policy interpretation reviewed de novo)