Klayman v. Obama
957 F. Supp. 2d 1
D.D.C.2013Background
- Plaintiffs (Larry Klayman and Charles Strange) sued federal agencies and officials after media disclosures that the NSA collected bulk telephony "metadata" under FISA § 1861 (Section 215) and maintained it in a consolidated database for up to five years.
- Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction (limited to the two plaintiffs who are Verizon subscribers) barring the Government from collecting or querying their telephony metadata and ordering destruction of any such records.
- The Government acknowledged a long-running program of daily production orders from telecommunications providers under FISA § 1861 but asserted much of the program’s detail remains classified and argued statutory schemes limit judicial review.
- The Court held it lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ APA statutory challenge to the Government’s authority under FISA § 1861 (preclusion), but retained authority to consider constitutional claims outside the FISC process.
- On the Fourth Amendment claim, the Court found plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge both collection and querying of bulk metadata, concluded the bulk collection/analysis likely constitutes a search, and granted a preliminary injunction as to Klayman and Strange (Klayman I) but denied relief in Klayman II; the injunction was stayed pending appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether APA/statutory claims challenging the Government's use of FISA § 1861 are judicially reviewable in district court | Klayman: Program exceeds statutory authority under § 1861; APA relief available | Gov: FISA provides a closed review system (only recipients can petition FISC); statutes imply preclusion of APA suits by third parties | Court: APA claim precluded — Congress created an exclusive FISC review scheme for § 1861 orders; district court lacks jurisdiction on the APA claim |
| Whether constitutional claims challenging FISC-authorized conduct are precluded | Klayman: Constitutional protections remain and district courts can hear such claims | Gov: FISC-centered scheme limits review | Court: Constitutional claims are not clearly precluded; district court may adjudicate them (Webster heightened standard not triggered) |
| Standing to challenge bulk collection and querying | Klayman: As Verizon subscribers and given declassified FISC orders and disclosures, plaintiffs’ metadata was collected and analyzed — injury is concrete and ongoing | Gov: Claims speculative (relying on Clapper), and plaintiff may not be included in disclosed orders | Court: Plaintiffs have standing to challenge both collection and querying — disclosures and program structure make injury traceable and imminent |
| Fourth Amendment: whether bulk collection/analysis is a search and reasonable | Klayman: Aggregated five-year collection and querying is a search and, absent individualized suspicion/judicial oversight, unreasonable | Gov: Smith v. Maryland controls — no reasonable expectation of privacy in telephony metadata; program is necessary for time-sensitive counterterrorism | Court: Likely to succeed on merits — Smith is distinguishable given scale, duration, aggregation, and modern cellphone ubiquity; the program likely constitutes an unreasonable search; injunction appropriate (limited to named Verizon-subscriber plaintiffs) |
Key Cases Cited
- Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (standing requires more than speculative chain of possibilities)
- Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (pen-register holding on customer expectation of privacy in numbers dialed)
- United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (long-term GPS monitoring implicated reasonable expectation of privacy; technology-driven doctrines may alter Fourth Amendment analysis)
- Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (use of technology to gather intimate details implicates Fourth Amendment)
- Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984) (statutory scheme can imply preclusion of judicial review when Congress provides detailed review mechanism)
- Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (clear congressional intent required to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims)
- Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (judicial restraint about premature constitutional rulings)