296 F. Supp. 3d 208
D.C. Cir.2018Background
- This lawsuit was filed in 2006; after extensive proceedings the only surviving claims at issue were limited breach‑of‑contract allegations in Counts Seven and Eight of the Second Amended Complaint (SAC).
- The surviving contractual allegations include: failure to remove plaintiff as lease guarantor; failure to pay children's health insurance; filing a motion to strike plaintiff's appearance in Florida litigation; refusal to provide client documents; and alleged disparagement/misrepresentations about plaintiff's departure.
- On June 15, 2017 the Court held plaintiff could not recover emotional‑distress damages because his remaining claims sounded in contract and not in independent tort (applying the D.C. “merger” rule).
- The Court granted leave to move for amendment but denied plaintiff’s July 18, 2017 motion to amend (seeking to add an IIED claim and to revive other dismissed tort claims) as untimely, prejudicial, and futile on January 19, 2018.
- Plaintiff moved for reconsideration under Rule 54(b) (and alternatively cited Rule 59(e)); the Court denied reconsideration, rejected renewal of the merger argument, found the IIED addition untimely and futile, and declined to certify an interlocutory appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Court should reconsider its denial of leave to amend to add an IIED claim | Klayman argued the Court erred and should allow amendment to add IIED and related tort claims | Defendants argued amendment is unduly delayed, prejudicial on eve of trial, and futile | Denied — no clear error shown; amendment would be untimely, prejudicial, and futile |
| Whether IIED damages “merged” into breach claims so emotional‑distress damages are available | Klayman sought to relitigate merger to recover emotional distress | Defendants relied on Choharis and prior rulings that the alleged conduct is not an independent tort | Denied — Court reaffirmed June 15, 2017 ruling that merger does not apply; plaintiff may not recover IIED damages from the contract claims |
| Whether adding IIED would survive a motion to dismiss (futility) | Klayman asserted facts alleging extreme, outrageous conduct and severe distress | Defendants stressed lack of specific facts, absence of medical/psychiatric evidence, faded memories, and discovery closed | Denied — IIED allegations were insufficiently specific and failed plausibility standard (Iqbal) |
| Whether interlocutory certification under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) is warranted | Klayman sought immediate appeal of denial to amend | Defendants argued appeal would cause piecemeal delay and not present controlling, unsettled legal question | Denied — would materially delay resolution and no controlling question meriting §1292(b) certification |
Key Cases Cited
- Klayman v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2009) (prior district decision in this litigation relied on for procedural posture)
- Choharis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 961 A.2d 1080 (D.C. 2008) (merger doctrine: emotional‑distress damages unavailable where tort duty does not exist independent of contract)
- Futrell v. Dep’t of Labor Fed. Credit Union, 816 A.2d 793 (D.C. 2003) (elements of IIED; extreme and outrageous conduct standard)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility pleading standard for motions to dismiss)
- Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) (Rule 15 amendment factors and discretion to deny leave to amend)