Klayman v. Judicial Watch, Inc.
22 F. Supp. 3d 1240
| S.D. Fla. | 2014Background
- Klayman, a high‑profile Florida attorney and public figure, alleges Judicial Watch is liable for defamatory statements about his alleged failure to pay child support that were spoken by its employee Constance Ruffley and republished online by Orly Taitz.
- In Feb 2012 Ruffley spoke with Taitz about Klayman; Taitz posted that Klayman “was convicted just recently of not paying large amounts in child support,” later correcting that he was indicted, not convicted.
- Public records show Klayman was indicted in Ohio for criminal nonsupport but was not convicted; an agreed judgment later established he satisfied payments and the indictment was dismissed.
- Klayman sued Judicial Watch for defamation (per se and general), defamation by implication, tortious interference with a contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress; Judicial Watch moved for summary judgment on all counts.
- The Court applied Florida law, treated Klayman as a public figure, and denied summary judgment on the defamation claim (Count I) but granted summary judgment for defamation by implication (Count II) and dismissed Counts III and IV under Florida’s single publication/single action rule.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether statement is defamation per se | Klayman: calling him “convicted” imputes criminality and harms his profession as an attorney | Judicial Watch: nonsupport is generally a misdemeanor in Ohio and the statement does not allege a felony or otherwise per se defamatory conduct | Court: Not per se on felony ground; whether it impugns his profession is jury question — summary judgment denied on Count I |
| Whether defendant published or is liable for republication | Klayman: Ruffley made the statement to Taitz and Judicial Watch is vicariously liable | Judicial Watch: it did not authorize publication and third‑party republication breaks liability; site posting is Taitz’s act | Court: Triable issues exist whether Ruffley said it and whether republication was foreseeable; employer vicarious liability is for jury — publication element survives summary judgment |
| Whether statement is substantially true (affirmative defense) | Klayman: statement is false — he was indicted, not convicted | Judicial Watch: the publication taken as a whole is substantially true (it reported indictment and details) | Court: Whether gist/sting is substantially true is a jury question — summary judgment denied on this defense |
| Whether other tort claims survive (defamation by implication; interference; IIED) | Klayman: implication and other torts arise from same publication and are independent | Judicial Watch: single publication rule bars claims that duplicate defamation; implication fails because core statement is false not implication from truthful facts | Court: Defamation by implication dismissed (fails as a distinct theory); Counts III and IV barred by single publication/single action rule |
Key Cases Cited
- New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (establishes actual malice standard for public figures)
- Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496 (truth/gist test for defamatory statements)
- Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So.2d 1098 (Fla. 2008) (defamation by implication framework and First Amendment protections)
- Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So.3d 1201 (Fla. 2010) (electronic publication into Florida; choice of law for online defamation)
- Wolfson v. Kirk, 273 So.2d 774 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) (defamation per se principles)
- Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1992) (single publication rule and preclusion of related torts)