KLAYMAN v. JUDICIAL WATCH, INC., 1:06-cv-00670

Plaintiff Larry Klayman filed a third motion seeking recusal/disqualification of Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and § 144, alleging extrajudicial bias and political hostility.
Klayman primarily complained about unfavorable judicial rulings: discovery sanctions imposed in 2009 and 2011, a 2017 damages opinion limiting recoverable damages, and perceived delays in ruling on motions in related Judicial Watch cases (2015 and 2017 cases).
Klayman also alleged the judge’s political bias (labeling her "leftist"), pointed to her Clinton-era appointment and her spouse’s past representation in an unrelated matter, and challenged procedural scheduling in a FOIA case (Freedom Watch).
Defendants opposed the motion, arguing Klayman relied on dissatisfaction with rulings and offered no extrajudicial evidence of bias; they also pointed out technical defects in the § 144 affidavit and timeliness problems.
The Court reviewed the record, applicable standards for § 455(a) and § 144, and prior written recusal opinions in this litigation, and concluded Klayman presented no objective evidence of extrajudicial bias and that his § 144 filing was procedurally deficient and untimely.
Result: The Court denied the motion to recuse/disqualify Judge Kollar-Kotelly.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 455(a) recusal is warranted	Judge’s impartiality reasonably questioned due to repeated unfavorable rulings, delays, and alleged political bias	Rulings are judicial acts; no extrajudicial source of bias; objective observer would not question impartiality	Denied — no extrajudicial bias; mere dissatisfaction with rulings insufficient
Whether § 144 affidavit is sufficient and timely	Affidavit asserts facts of bias and lists incidents (sanctions, damages opinion, delays, political views)	Affidavit contains conclusory allegations, lacks particularized facts, and was not filed at the earliest moment	Denied — affidavit legally insufficient and untimely under § 144
Whether judicial rulings and discovery sanctions can show bias	Rulings and sanctions show antagonism and limited ability to present case	Judicial rulings (and case-specific findings) almost never constitute extrajudicial bias; prior detailed opinions support decisions	Denied — rulings are reasoned judicial decisions, not evidence of extrajudicial bias
Whether judge’s appointment/spouse or unrelated prior rulings show political bias	Clinton appointment, spouse’s past representation, and certain rulings (e.g., Brady, FOIA scheduling) evidence left-leaning bias	Appointment or spouse’s unrelated activities do not demonstrate bias; disagreeing with rulings is not grounds for recusal	Denied — these factors do not provide objective proof of bias

Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994) (judicial rulings alone generally do not establish bias requiring recusal)
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.) (recusal standard: appearance of bias assessed objectively by a reasonable informed observer)
SEC v. Loving Spirit Found., Inc., 392 F.3d 486 (D.C. Cir.) (timeliness and sufficiency requirements for § 144; affidavit must be filed at earliest moment)
United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir.) (judge may pass on the legal sufficiency and timeliness of a § 144 challenge)
Hanrahan v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 471 (D.D.C.) (affidavit under § 144 must allege facts with particularity; courts accept allegations as true when testing legal sufficiency)
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966) (bias must usually stem from an extrajudicial source to be disqualifying)