Kittatinny Canoes, Inc. v. Westfall Township
30 Pa. D. & C.5th 46
Pennsylvania Court of Common P...2013Background
- Defendant Westfall Township enacted Amusement Tax Ordinance No. 158, effective January 4, 2013, imposing a 1% tax on admissions to amusements and defining admissions broadly.
- The burden of collecting the tax is on
- Plaintiffs Kittatinny Canoes and Indian Head Canoes operate canoe liveries on the Delaware River within the township and gather customers at their own facilities before or during river trips that cross into New York and New Jersey.
- Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the Amusement Tax is unconstitutional as applied and preempted by federal law; they moved for a preliminary injunction.
- The court overruled the township’s preliminary objections and granted a preliminary injunction to restrain enforcement of the tax on plaintiffs’ Delaware River operations.
- Plaintiffs argued irreparable harm and lack of an adequate legal remedy, given administrative burdens, potential refunds to customers, and the likelihood of federal preemption under 33 U.S.C. §5(b).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether irreparable harm and inadequate remedy at law shown | Plaintiffs argue they will suffer irreparable harm and no adequate refund remedy exists. | Defendant contends harm is compensable and plaintiffs have alternative statutory remedies. | Yes; irreparable harm shown and no adequate legal remedy. |
| Whether the Amusement Tax is preempted by federal law | Plaintiffs contend 33 U.S.C. §5(b) preempts the tax on watercraft-related activities. | Defendant argues MTSA history allows the tax and cites lack of explicit preemption. | Likely preempted; the tax as applied to canoe liveries on the Delaware River is preempted. |
| Whether Section 6 of the Local Tax Enabling Act is the exclusive remedy for challenging the ordinance | Plaintiffs argue Section 6 is not exclusive; refunds and equity available. | Defendant asserts Section 6 is the sole statutory avenue to challenge the ordinance. | Not exclusive; alternative remedies permitted where inadequate. |
| Whether the case falls within field preemption or irreconcilable conflict | Plaintiffs rely on field or irreconcilable conflict preemption under §5(b). | Defendant argues no preemption or conflict exists under the MTSA history. | Preemption established; irreconcilable conflict with §5(b). |
| Whether the public interest supports maintaining the injunction | Equity favors restraining an uncollected tax with likely preemption. | Public interest favors revenue and enforcement of local tax authority. | Injunction appropriate to protect constitutional claim and avoid preemption issues. |
Key Cases Cited
- Kiak v. Crown Equip. Corp., 989 A.2d 385 (Pa. Super. 2010) (standard for federal preemption considerations)
- Wm. Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 346 A.2d 269 (Pa. 1975) (inadequacy of refund as remedy in equity exception to statutory remedies)
- Borough of Green Tree v. Bd. of Property Assessments, Appeals and Review of Allegheny County, 328 A.2d 819 (Pa. 1974) (strict pursuit of statutorily-prescribed remedies; exception for inadequate remedies)
- Jamison Coal & Coke Co. v. School Dist. of Unity Twp., 66 A.2d 759 (Pa. 1949) (equitable relief where statutory exemptions apply to preexisting taxes)
- Pittsburgh, A. & M Ry. Co. v. Stowe Twp., 97 A. 197 (Pa. 1916) (equitable restraining when tax is illegal or without authority)
- Wm. Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 346 A.2d 269 (Pa. 1975) (refund remedies and adequacy; preemption discussion)