22 N.E.3d 981
Mass. App. Ct.2015Background
- The Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah) historically exercised customary common-access paths across lands in Martha’s Vineyard that predate the late 18th century.
- In the late 19th century, Massachusetts statutes enfranchised tribe members and authorized judicial partition (1870s) of common lands into individual lots; commissioners prepared a plan and deeds in severalty, most of which did not show access roads or reserve express easements.
- Plaintiffs (successors to some parcel grantees) claim many lots are landlocked and seek implied easements by necessity based on the Tribe’s preexisting common-access practice and Restatement (Third) §2.15 / Massachusetts law.
- The Land Court originally found no implied easements by necessity (concluding no shared intent to create easements at partition); this Court reverses and remands, holding easements by necessity should be implied and the Land Court should define easement lines.
- Dissent argues plaintiffs failed to prove the required intent at the time of the 1870s partition, emphasizes that necessity alone does not create an easement, and insists Massachusetts common law requires proving parties’ presumed intent when deeds omit access rights.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether easements by necessity exist for lots created by the 1870s partition | The Tribe’s longstanding custom of common access plus the statutory/judicial partition implies servitudes to avoid landlocking; Restatement §2.15 supports implying access unless parties clearly intended otherwise | Partition deeds omitted easements and tribal custom meant no need to reserve rights; plaintiffs must prove intent at time of partition — necessity alone insufficient | Majority: Easements by necessity implied — preexisting tribal common access and §2.15/Mass. law support implying servitudes; remand to Land Court to define easements |
| Whether governmental partition and subsequent conveyances extinguished preexisting tribal access rights | Governmental grant/partition did not negate preexisting customary access; such rights ‘‘carry through’’ into severalty | The partition process and deeds show no express easement; absence of roadways on plan and contemporary conditions rebut presumption of intent to grant easements | Majority: Preexisting common-access rights survive partition and support implied easements; not extinguished by statutory partition |
| Standard / burden for implying easements from historic conveyances | Use Restatement §2.15 presumption that conveyances that would deprive access imply servitudes unless parties clearly intended contrary; Massachusetts law aligns | Under Massachusetts law, presumption exists but claimant must prove parties’ intent at the time of conveyance; necessity must have existed contemporaneously; customary tribal access negates contemporaneous necessity | Majority: Apply Restatement §2.15 and Massachusetts law to imply easements here; dissent: requires strict proof of intent and rejects implication on these facts |
| Remedy / scope determination | Court should remand to Land Court to locate and delineate easement paths consistent with custom and legal doctrines | Defendants emphasize uncertainty and lack of metes-and-bounds descriptions; argue courts should respect original partition plan and title certainty | Held: Remand to Land Court to draw easement lines applying easement-by-necessity doctrine; exact paths to be determined judicially |
Key Cases Cited
- Orpin v. Morrison, 230 Mass. 529 (establishes presumption and strict construction for easements by necessity)
- Davis v. Sikes, 254 Mass. 540 (presumption that grantor will provide access; easement implied to avoid landlocking)
- Kitras v. Aquinnah, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 285 (prior appellate decision addressing joinder and remanding easement question)
- Nichols v. Luce, 24 Pick. 102 (necessity alone does not create an implied easement)
- Ward v. McGlory, 358 Mass. 322 (doctrine of easement by necessity effectuates parties’ intent)
- Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (federal law on Indian occupancy and distinction between fee and aboriginal title)