Kite v. State, 424 P.3d 255

Background

On Oct. 24, 2016, Cortney Kite led a high-speed chase on I-25, crossed the median, and drove north in southbound lanes, forcing several vehicles off the road; he later fled on foot and was arrested.
State charged Kite with aggravated assault and battery under two alternative theories: (a)(i) attempts to cause serious bodily injury intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference, and (a)(ii) attempts to cause bodily injury with a deadly weapon; plus several misdemeanors.
Prior to trial Kite sought to strike "knowingly, or recklessly" and the "extreme indifference" language from (a)(i), arguing attempt requires specific intent; the court denied the motion and instructed the jury that (a)(i) could be satisfied by intentionally OR knowingly OR recklessly attempting to cause serious bodily injury.
The jury found Kite guilty of aggravated assault and battery and other counts; the verdict form specifically found that the assault was an "intentional attempt to cause serious bodily injury."
On appeal, Kite argued (1) the jury instruction erred by treating (a)(i) as permitting multiple mental states (including recklessness) for attempt, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to prove he intended to cause serious bodily injury.
Court: (a)(i) is a specific-intent (attempt) crime; although the elements instruction included improper language, the instructions read with the verdict form still legally supported conviction; evidence was sufficient to let a jury infer Kite intentionally attempted to cause serious bodily injury. Court affirmed but remanded to correct clerical sentencing/statement errors.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court erred by instructing the jury that attempted serious bodily injury under § 6-2-502(a)(i) could be satisfied by intentionally OR knowingly OR recklessly attempting to cause injury	Kite: (a)(i) is a specific-intent attempt crime; "knowingly" and "recklessly" are inconsistent with attempt and should be excluded	State: Legislative language permits proof of specific intent via any of the listed mental states; past precedent allowed such instruction	Court: (a)(i) is a specific-intent crime; "recklessly" is incompatible with attempt, but given the elements instruction plus the verdict form’s explicit finding of intentional attempt, the jury had a legally sufficient basis to convict (instructional error was harmless)
Whether evidence was insufficient to prove Kite specifically intended to cause serious bodily injury	Kite: He did not intend to injure—he intended to force the trooper to stop by creating danger, and he could have struck vehicles if he wanted to injure	State: His deliberate lane changes into oncoming traffic, acceleration toward vehicles, and recorded statements support an inference he intended to cause an accident/injury	Court: Evidence and reasonable inferences support finding Kite intentionally aimed to cause an accident (specific intent); denial of judgment of acquittal affirmed

Key Cases Cited

Dockter v. State, 396 P.3d 405 (Wyo. 2017) (standard for viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the State)
Sam v. State, 401 P.3d 834 (Wyo. 2017) (attempt to cause bodily injury with a deadly weapon is a specific-intent crime; used to analogize (a)(i))
Cecil v. State, 364 P.3d 1086 (Wyo. 2015) (discussed legislative amendment adding attempt language to (a)(i); court limited its precedential reach here)
Schafer v. State, 197 P.3d 1247 (Wyo. 2008) (held absence of attempt language in some subsections precluded attempt charge; prompted legislative amendment)
Kearns v. State, 48 P.3d 1090 (Wyo. 2002) (clerical sentencing errors may be corrected where jury verdict and charging instrument control)
Noel v. State, 319 P.3d 134 (Wyo. 2014) (general principle that attempt crimes require specific intent)