Kishna Brown v. Bradley Lewis, 779 F.3d 401

Background

911 operator overheard an intoxicated male at 305 Marsac Street making alarming statements (including “I’m gonna kill that bitch”) and suggesting police were coming; other voices on the call mocked him. The operator did not tell officers the caller was intoxicated or that he remained inside the house.
Officers observed a car drive away from the Marsac Street house and followed it; believing (based on radio info) the driver might be connected to the 911 call, they activated lights and intended to stop it.
The driver, Kishna Brown, pulled into a BP station; officers approached with weapons drawn, ordered her out, and (per Brown) two officers grabbed her, threw her to the ground, kneeled on her back, handcuffed her, and detained her for about ten minutes.
Brown sued individual officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure and excessive force) and under Michigan law (assault and battery); defendants moved for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity and Michigan governmental immunity.
The district court denied immunity, concluding that (1) officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the car but the stop became an arrest once they could have determined the male caller was not in the vehicle, and (2) the force used was excessive; the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the stop an investigative Terry stop or did it ripen into an arrest requiring probable cause?	Brown: initial stop became an arrest when officers used force, kept her handcuffed, and detained her after it was or should have been clear the male 911 caller was not in the car.	Officers: had reasonable suspicion via collective knowledge to stop the vehicle and their conduct was a permissible investigative detention.	Stop was lawful initially but ripened into an unlawful arrest once officers could determine the male caller was not in the car and yet used force and continued detention.
Did officers have qualified immunity on the unlawful-seizure claim?	Brown: seizure violated Fourth Amendment and law was clearly established limiting intrusiveness and duration of a Terry stop.	Officers: their reliance on dispatch and radio justified the stop and conduct; Dorsey and related precedent warrant deference.	Qualified immunity denied for unlawful-seizure claim from the point officers should have known the male caller was not in the vehicle and also for the intrusive manner of the stop.
Was the force used (throwing Brown to ground, knee on back, handcuffing) objectively unreasonable/excessive?	Brown: she was compliant and unarmed; force was gratuitous and severe.	Officers: use of force was reasonable under tense, uncertain circumstances and they dispute who actually applied force.	Viewing Brown's facts as true, force was excessive; qualified immunity denied.
Are officers entitled to Michigan governmental immunity on assault and battery?	Brown: actions were malicious or showed such indifference to harm as to foreclose immunity.	Officers: conduct was within scope and in good faith, so statutory immunity applies.	Denied: under Michigan's Odom standard, jury could find malice/indifference; immunity not established at summary judgment.

Key Cases Cited

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (qualified immunity framework permitting court to address prongs in any order)
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (qualified immunity contours and clearly established law standard)
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (collective-knowledge doctrine for stops based on others' information)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (excessive-force/Graham objective-reasonableness test)
Smoak v. Hall, 460 F.3d 768 (limits on intrusiveness of Terry stop; handcuffing and detention can be unreasonable)
Dorsey v. Barber, 517 F.3d 389 (discussion of qualified immunity where stop methods arguably unreasonable)
Humphrey v. Mabry, 482 F.3d 840 (limitation on collective-knowledge in individual-capacity suits)
Odom v. Wayne County, 760 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. 2008) (Michigan standard for governmental immunity in intentional-tort claims)